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Abstract 
Fifteen years of economic reform in Russia: what has been achieved? What remains to be done? 
The paper provides an overview of the course of economic reform and the performance of the Russian 
economy since the early 1990s and an analysis of the structural reform challenges ahead. It assesses the 
contribution of institutional and structural reforms to economic performance over the period, before 
turning to the question of where further structural reforms could make the biggest contribution to improved 
performance. Three major conclusions emerge. First, there is still a great deal to be done to strengthen the 
basic institutions of the market economy. While the Russian authorities have embarked on some 
impressive – and often technically complex – ‘second-generation’ reforms, many ‘first-generation’ reforms 
have yet to be completed. Secondly, the central challenges of Russia’s second decade of reform are 
primarily concerned with reforming state institutions. Thirdly, the pursuit of reforms across a broad front 
could enable Russia to profit from complementarities that exist among various strands of reform. 
JEL Classification: H1; K2; P21; P26; P27; P31; P37; P48. 
Keywords: Russia; economy; reform; growth; stabilisation; transparency; corruption; state ownership; 
competition; transition. 
* * * 
Résumé 
Quinze ans de réformes économiques en Russie : Qu’a-t-elle acquis ? Que reste-t-il à faire ? 
L’article donne un aperçu du déroulement des réformes économiques et des performances de 
l’économie russe depuis le début des années 90, ainsi qu’une analyse des enjeux des futures réformes 
structurelles. L’article considère la contribution des réformes institutionnelles et structurelles à la 
performance économique durant la période, avant d’examiner dans quels domaines des réformes 
structurelles additionnelles pourraient avoir la plus grande contribution à l’amélioration de la performance 
économique. Il en résulte trois conclusions majeures. Premièrement, il reste encore beaucoup à faire pour 
renforcer les institutions de base d’une économie de marché. Bien que les autorités russes aient commencé 
quelques réformes de « seconde génération » qui sont impressionnantes – et souvent techniquement 
complexes-, il reste un bon nombre de réformes de « première génération » à achever. Deuxièmement, les 
défis centraux de la deuxième décennie de réformes concernent en première ligne la réforme des 
institutions de l’État. Troisièmement, la poursuite des réformes sur un large front permettrait à la Russie de 
profiter des complémentarités existantes entre les différents axes des réformes. 
 
Classification JEL: H1 ; K2 ; P21 ; P26 ; P27 ; P31 ; P37 ; P48. 
Mots clés : Russie ; économie ; réforme ; croissance ; stabilisation ; transparence ; corruption ; 
entreprises d’État ; concurrence. 
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FIFTEEN YEARS OF ECONOMIC REFORM IN RUSSIA:  
WHAT HAS BEEN ACHIEVED? WHAT REMAINS TO BE DONE? 
Rudiger Ahrend and William Tompson1 
Introduction 
The present paper provides a broad overview of the course of economic reform and the performance 
of the Russian economy since the onset of the market transformation and an analysis of the structural 
reform challenges that still lie ahead.2 The discussion begins with an analysis of economic policy and 
performance since the early 1990s. It then considers the contribution that institutional and structural 
reforms have made to recent performance, before turning to the question of where further structural reform 
would facilitate improved economic performance. Three major conclusions emerge from the analysis:  
• There is still a great deal to be done to strengthen the basic institutions and framework conditions 
for the market economy. Establishing the rule of law and the security of property rights, 
increasing the transparency and accountability of state institutions, and combating corruption all 
remain critical priorities. While the Russian authorities have embarked on some impressive – and 
often technically complex – ‘second-generation’ reforms in fields such as electricity 
restructuring, many ‘first-generation’ reforms have yet to be completed. 
• The central challenges of Russia’s second decade of reform are primarily concerned with the 
reform of state institutions. Among the main tasks ahead are the civil service reform, judicial 
reform and the creation of new regulatory institutions and new forms of regulation better suited 
the needs of a market economy.  
• The pursuit of reforms across a broad front could enable Russia to benefit from the 
complementarities that exist among various strands of reform. In a number of spheres, seemingly 
unrelated reforms are actually mutually reinforcing, sometimes in unexpected ways. Thus, there 
would appear to be synergies between reforms in such seemingly diverse spheres as corporate 
governance and competition policy or judicial reform and financial regulation. In such cases, the 
returns generated by implementing two or more reforms in tandem could exceed the sum of those 
that would be realised if each were pursued separately.  
                                                     
1. Economics Department, OECD, 2 rue André Pascal, 75775 Paris CEDEX 16, France; 
rudiger.ahrend@oecd.org or william.tompson@oecd.org. This paper is based on work done in conjunction 
with the OECD Regulatory Reform Review of the Russian Federation, and the authors are grateful to the 
many Russian and western officials, experts and businessmen, too numerous to list here by name, who 
discussed economic and regulatory reform issues with them. Special thanks go to Corinne Chanteloup for 
technical assistance, as well as to Muriel Duluc for secretarial assistance. The  opinions expressed in the 
paper are theirs and do not necessarily reflect the views of the OECD or its member states. 
2. As this paper has been prepared in conjunction with the OECD Regulatory Reform Review of Russia, it 
places special emphasis on characteristics of the economy of particular relevance to regulatory reform.   
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The last of these three points is closely related to the former two, in so far as many of the reform 
complementarities addressed in the paper refer to the dependence of ‘second generation’ reforms on 
improvements in the functioning of state institutions and in the basic institutions of the market economy.  
I. Setting the scene: the macroeconomic context  
The macroeconomic context for structural reform in Russia has been defined by the post-communist 
transformation of the country’s political and economic systems. It is critical to appreciate the dual nature of 
this transition. When Russia embarked on its transition to the market in January 1992, it had just emerged 
as an independent country from the break-up of the Soviet Union. While it inherited many of the structures 
of the now defunct Soviet state, the new Russia still lacked certain attributes conventionally associated 
with statehood. It had neither its own currency nor control over its borders, and it was unable to perform 
such basic functions as tax collection. Subnational governments openly defied the centre, while central 
bureaucracies were in turmoil. The transition to a more democratic form of government was still in its 
early stages, and many of the institutions and other structures inherited from the Soviet Union were 
singularly ill suited to the needs of Russia’s democratic and market transitions. The last thirteen years have 
therefore been about reconstructing the state no less than about marketisation. 
The transition began in the midst of a severe economic crisis… 
Any analysis of Russia’s market transformation must begin with the terminal crisis of the Soviet 
system. It is crucial to understand the situation facing the Russian Federation when it emerged as a newly 
independent state and embarked on radical economic reforms in the wake of the Soviet collapse. While this 
crisis had its roots in the long-term secular decline in growth rates experienced by the USSR from the 
1950s onwards, the final breakdown of the Soviet command economy was precipitated by a combination 
of external shocks,3 ill conceived reforms and growing political unrest. The half-hearted economic reforms 
of the late 1980s, which aimed to introduce some market efficiencies into the Soviet system, merely made 
matters worse: they undermined many of the traditional structures and disciplines of the command 
economy without putting anything effective in their place.  
By 1991, the polity was fragmenting and the economy was in free-fall. Real GDP that year dropped 
by somewhere between 8 and 17 per cent – estimates vary widely, owing to the chaotic economic and 
political situation of the time.4 Rising subsidies to back controlled prices, falling production and collapsing 
tax discipline pushed the Soviet state budget deficit above 16 per cent of GDP.5 Since this deficit could 
only be financed by printing money, the money supply ballooned, wrecking what remained of the system 
of price controls. Although the Soviet authorities continued to shy away from price liberalisation, 
wholesale price inflation in 1991 reached 138.1 per cent and retail price inflation 90.4 per cent; food prices 
jumped 112 per cent. The combination of price-controls and monetary incontinence meant that very high 
inflation coexisted with the shortages produced by price controls.6 The external picture was equally dismal. 
Exports in 1991 fell by 40 per cent in dollar terms and imports by 80 per cent. The Soviet external debt 
                                                     
3. These included the Chernobyl nuclear accident, the international oil price collapse of 1986, and a sharp 
decline in the value of the dollar in 1986–87. Chernobyl, in addition to its enormous human cost, arguably 
wrecked the 12th Five-Year Plan. The oil price drop represented a major terms of trade shock, while the 
decline of the dollar merely aggravated this effect, since Soviet exports were generally priced in dollars but 
most imports were invoiced in West European currencies, particularly the Deutschmark.  
4. Granville (1995:14); see also Ericson (1995:37).  
5. Sinel’nikov (1995:20). It reached 26 per cent according to the IMF’s calculations; see IMF (1992). 
6. Fewer than a dozen of the 130 goods considered by the statistical authorities to be basic necessities for 
everyday life were available through normal retail channels by late 1991.   
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reached $67bn – roughly 566 per cent of rouble GDP at the market exchange rate. Foreign exchange 
reserves fell to $60m, around 10 hours’ import cover – a product of western insistence that Russia service 
its debts until a restructuring could be agreed. An appreciation of these conditions is crucial to 
understanding why the early stages of the transition unfolded as they did. 
… which prompted the authorities to opt for a ‘big bang’ approach to reforms 
Faced with such an acute crisis, the Russian authorities at the end of 1991 concluded that they must 
act decisively and without delay. They opted for a ‘big bang’ approach to economic transformation, 
involving the rapid implementation of price and trade liberalisation, as well as large-scale privatisation. 
Critics have argued the public and the elite would have been more open to a gradualist approach, 
employing the traditional instruments of the old system, like administered price rises and rationing, to 
stabilise the situation before proceeding with reforms. However, given the erosion of central authority and 
the decay of Soviet economic institutions, it was not at all clear that such an approach was feasible, let 
alone desirable. The system of fixed prices had largely collapsed and it is doubtful whether even the most 
determined cabinet could have re-imposed wide-ranging price controls and ensured supplies of goods at 
official prices in sufficient quantities for the system to have any credibility. On 2 January 1992, therefore, 
some 90 per cent of retail and 80 per cent of producer prices were freed. The main exceptions were energy, 
some raw materials and some basic foodstuffs. At the same time, the government moved quickly towards 
external liberalisation. The state foreign trade monopoly was abolished, and quantitative controls on 
imports were scrapped in January. A flat 5 per cent import tariff was adopted in July.  
These measures were accompanied by drastic cuts in federal spending, particularly on such previously 
sacrosanct items as defence procurement. Fiscal tightening was to be accompanied by tight monetary 
policies in an effort to ensure that, once the relative price adjustments set in train by liberalisation had 
taken place and the excess rouble liquidity generated in the late Soviet era had been absorbed, prices would 
stabilise at their new levels. Soon after prices were freed, the rapid privatisation of state property was 
undertaken, initially via a voucher scheme that was meant to enable virtually the whole of the country’s 
adult population to become asset owners on at least a small scale. Rapid privatisation was intended to 
create a broad class of share owners who, having acquired a stake in the system, would support further 
reforms. It was also meant to separate economic and political decision-making and thereby to cut failing 
enterprises off from the state budget. Ultimately, the intention was to foster the emergence of a population 
of real sink-or-swim firms whose managers would have incentives to use resources efficiently. In any case, 
rapid privatisation was seen as a necessity in part because a process of spontaneous privatisation was 
already well under way.7 One of the government’s chief priorities in this sphere was to regain a measure of 
control over that process. When the voucher phase ended in mid-1994, the state’s average holding had 
fallen to 38 per cent across all industrial firms (including those not privatised at all to mid-1994) and an 
average of just 15 per cent in privatised enterprises. According to Goskomstat data, 57.9 per cent of the 
workforce (including 76 per cent of the industrial workforce) was employed in privatised or new private 
firms. Over 70 per cent of small-scale enterprises had been transferred to private ownership. 
Political realities imposed limits on all three major strands of reform:  
• After the initial shock of the January 1992 liberalisation package, price liberalisation actually 
proceeded relatively slowly, as many regional authorities feared the popular response to any rapid 
elimination of price controls on basic necessities, while the federal government feared the impact 
on industry of liberalising energy prices.  
                                                     
7. See Solnick (1998) and Rosefielde and Hedlund (2004). 
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• Trade liberalisation was also far from complete. Exports of many commodities (most notably oil) 
were subject to quotas or very high export duties in an effort to hold down domestic prices. 
Numerous controls on imports remained, alongside subsidised imports of some necessities. Such 
controls appeased certain domestic constituencies and also created lucrative opportunities for 
those administering them.  
• The authorities were able to proceed with voucher privatisation only after amending the 
legislation to grant special privileges to enterprise insiders (managers and labour collectives), 
thereby ensuring that most enterprises would emerge from the process with a dispersed and 
insider-oriented ownership structure.  
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The initial reform package was followed by several years of high inflation and falling output 
The immediate results of the initial reform package were a spike in inflation and a large drop in GDP 
in 1992. What was unexpected, however, was that the output fall carried on far longer than expected. With 
the exception of a weak pick-up in 1997, the economy continued to contract until 1999. Inflation fell 
sharply after the initial shock, as had been anticipated, but the authorities succumbed to pressure for looser 
policies in mid-1992 and inflation surged again. The initial reform package of 1992 might have produced 
better results sooner had it been followed quickly by a range of other structural reforms needed to create 
the necessary framework for a market economy. That this did not occur was above all due to the failure to 
sustain the macroeconomic discipline needed to achieve stabilisation quickly. The reformers had believed 
that, after the initial freeing of prices, tight fiscal and monetary policies would bring about macroeconomic 
stability by late 1992, setting the stage for an output recovery. In the event, it took four years to reduce 
inflation to double digits. The process of structural reform in many spheres simply stalled, while the 
government concentrated its energies on stabilisation. In any case, many needed structural measures were 
opposed by powerful vested interests,8 and the weakness of state institutions meant that the federal 
authorities simply lacked the administrative capacity to implement many structural reforms. Nevertheless, 
the initial reform push of 1992 succeeded in laying the foundations for a market economy. 
The price liberalisation of early 1992 led not only to a large relative adjustment of prices, but also to a 
sharp increase in the general price level. This initial jump in the price level was expected. It was chiefly a 
product of the ‘monetary overhang’ that had developed in the late Soviet period as a result of money wages 
rising far faster than productivity.9 Households and firms at the end of 1991 were holding more roubles 
than they wished, simply because there was nothing to buy with them.10 When prices were freed, this mass 
of excess roubles drove prices up rapidly. Monthly inflation reached 245 per cent in January 1992. This 
jump was a one-off adjustment, and monthly inflation declined rapidly to around 10 per cent in the 
summer. However, this progress proved to be short-lived, as monetisation of budget deficits and large-
scale financing of the enterprise sector via central bank money creation continued. Inflation rose 
significantly in the second half of 1992 and stayed very high throughout 1993. The challenge of 
disinflation was greatly complicated by the maintenance of the rouble zone: the rouble remained the 
national currency of most former Soviet states in 1992–93, but no satisfactory arrangements for managing 
it were ever agreed.11 Instead, participating central banks abused their ability to create quasi-money, mainly 
to finance ailing enterprises in their respective countries. Each member state thus reaped the benefits of any 
additional quasi-money it created, while the ensuing additional inflation was shared across the zone.12 
There were thus strong incentives for monetary creation. The Central Bank of Russian (CBR) lacked any 
effective mechanism to prevent such behaviour and was itself heavily engaged in extending soft credits to 
the Russian enterprise sector. After the break-up of the rouble zone and with the CBR focusing more on 
limiting growth of monetary aggregates, inflation started to decline from end-1993.  
                                                     
8. In many cases, these interests were precisely those which had gained from the first wave of reforms: 
incomplete early reforms created winners who resisted further reform efforts. For a detailed analysis, see 
Hellman (1998). 
9. This overhang had begun to develop by about the 1960s but grew extremely rapidly in the late 1980s. 
Wages jumped by around one-third during 1987–91, while output per worker actually declined. 
10. In an economy with free prices, this excess rouble liquidity would have resulted in inflation. In the Soviet 
context, repressed inflationary pressures expressed themselves in chronic shortages, rationing and queues 
on the one hand, and the accumulation of excess rouble liquidity on the other. 
11. It is not clear that any effective regime for governing the rouble zone could have been negotiated, given the 
political situation at the time.  
12. In essence, the rouble zone developed into a classic example of a ‘common pool problem’. 
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On the official data, real GDP fell by around 32 per cent during 1992–94, continuing the sharp 
contraction of the previous two years. Moreover, recorded output continued to decline through 1995 and 
1996. The initial output drop must to a large degree be seen as the result of the dramatic changes that 
resulted from the attempt to transform a command into a market economy. Unsurprisingly, 1992 saw the 
largest drop in GDP – of around 15 per cent. From a demand-side perspective, a large part of the drop was 
explained by a sharp fall in private consumption that was connected to the uncertainties created by price 
and other reforms, as well as diminishing real purchasing power. On the supply side, a major reason for the 
contraction was the attempt to impose hard budget constraints on the enterprise sector for the first time. 
Yet while the continuation of the downturn in 1993–94 was to a significant degree part of an unavoidable 
transition shock, there were also other factors at work. High and volatile inflation had a significant 
negative impact throughout 1993–94, while the gradual break-up of the rouble zone, which did at least 
allow the CBR to focus on reducing inflation, contributed to further contraction in trade among the former 
Soviet republics.  
While the fall in output was generalised across the economy, there were nonetheless very significant 
differences between sectors. Resource-based industries, which responded to collapsing domestic demand 
by increasing exports, held up relatively well, as did the service sector. Domestically oriented industrial 
sectors, by contrast, fared particularly badly. The low level of international competitiveness of these 
sectors meant that they could not export their output in order to offset the effects of shrinking domestic 
demand. 
Box 1. Reported GDP declines and socio-economic realities 
While there is no doubt that the initial transition recession was traumatic for Russia, there is considerable debate 
about just how severe it was and about whether output has yet recovered to its pre-transition peak. Official Russian 
data show real GDP falling by almost half from 1990 to 1998, with the post-crisis recovery bringing it to just over 80 per 
cent of its pre-transition level in 2003. In reality, the total output fall was almost certainly smaller than these numbers 
suggest.1 Under the Soviet system, enterprises had strong incentives to over-report their production. Moreover, pre-
1992 prices had little meaning. Relative prices in the manufacturing and consumer good sectors – compared to prices 
for natural resources and basic commodities – were generally far too high, so their share in aggregate output was 
significantly overstated. To the extent that the size of those sectors suffering the sharpest decline was overstated at 
the outset, so was the subsequent output collapse.  Even so, Gavrilenkov and Koen (1994) estimate that real output 
fell by almost one-third during 1989–94. Much of the output collapse consisted of an end to production of goods that 
were of questionable value, and for which there was little, if any, demand. This point is highlighted by the fact that 
roughly 15 per cent of 1991 output proved impossible to sell – even in an environment characterised by widespread 
shortages and a monetary overhang – and was basically produced for stocks. 
Since much of the ‘lost’ output had contributed little to the welfare of the population in any case, the fall in living 
standards during the transition – while substantial – was far smaller than the decline in production. This is reflected in 
both the official statistics (which, critics argue, tend in any case to underestimate incomes and consumption) and 
survey data on household consumption. Working on the basis of the official data, Gavrilenkov and Yasin (2005) find 
that private consumption never fell below 90% of its pre-reform (1991) level and that it has exceeded that level since 
2000. Nevertheless, the available data from virtually all sources confirm that the transition has been extremely difficult 
for most households. Living standards for most Russians fell in the 1990s, and poverty increased dramatically (though 
it has been falling in recent years), while the health system and other social services deteriorated considerably and 
remain in dire need of both resources and reform. Indicators of basic human welfare, such as life expectancy, which 
had begun falling during the Soviet period, have continued to worsen. The incidence of tuberculosis and other poverty-
related diseases has risen dramatically. While there has been a marked rise in incomes and levels of consumption 
since 1999, with the largest increases in consumption coming among the least well off, health and mortality indicators 
have yet to improve much. 
1. See OECD (1995:8–13) for a detailed discussion of the issue.  
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An exchange-rate-based stabilisation strategy reduced inflation but at a very high price 
After the roller coaster stabilisation efforts of 1992–94, the authorities in 1995 opted for an exchange-
rate based strategy that brought inflation down rapidly. However, this approach brought about a very rapid 
real appreciation of the exchange rate, which roughly doubled in value over the course of 1995. The toll 
this took on enterprises’ competitiveness probably explains to a large degree why output continued to fall 
in 1995–96, rather than beginning to recover as the experience of other transition countries would have 
suggested.13 The other major obstacle to recovery was fiscal. The exchange rate-based stabilisation was not 
accompanied by the fiscal adjustment needed to make it sustainable: the general government deficit was 
around 6 per cent of GDP in 1995 and rose to 10 per cent in 1996. Indeed, the very success of the 
exchange-rate strategy allowed the government to postpone fiscal adjustment, as it enabled the government 
to finance ever larger deficits on financial markets and so to avoid politically costly deficit financing via 
the printing press.14 The rapid growth of short-term domestic debt became increasingly burdensome for the 
budget, and rising debt service obligations contributed to further increasing budget deficits. The stock of 
rouble-denominated government debt rose from 4.5 per cent of GDP at the end of 1995 to around 18 per 
cent of GDP at the end of April 1998. Since the lack of fiscal progress was evident to many observers, 
there were doubts from the beginning about the sustainability of the exchange rate-based stabilisation. 
Such doubts kept interest rates higher than they would otherwise have been, thereby aggravating the 
government’s debt problems and prolonging the output contraction. 
Politically, fiscal stabilisation would in any case have been extremely difficult, if not impossible, in 
the circumstances. The rapid real exchange rate appreciation of 1995 had led to sharply rising input costs 
of labour and energy when measured in international currency terms. As the competitiveness of Russian 
industry deteriorated, the share of enterprises in ‘good or normal’ financial condition fell from an already 
low 35 per cent in early 1995 to 15 per cent at the end of that year. Yet few were bankrupted. Instead, a 
large part of Russian industry continued to be kept afloat via subsidies. This reflected both the power of 
industrial managers as a lobby and fear of the social consequences of structural change. Since direct 
subsidies from the budget and soft credits from the CBR had largely been eliminated by the mid-nineties, 
subsidisation had increasingly started to take place via unpenalised arrears to the state-controlled gas and 
electricity monopolies, OAO Gazprom and RAO UES. Enterprises also ‘borrowed’ increasingly from 
workers, the state and other suppliers, via wage, tax and payment arrears.15 Increasing tax claims in such 
circumstances led mainly to increases in tax arrears. Yet imposing real financial discipline – Kornai’s 
(1986) hard budget constraints – on the behemoths of former Soviet industry would probably have been 
politically impossible, given how widespread these problems were. A serious crackdown on non-payments 
would have risked shutting down a large part of industry overnight. 
For a time, three developments served to obscure the seriousness of the situation. First, the debt 
dynamics were masked by the rapid real appreciation of the rouble. The strengthening rouble ensured that 
the total debt-to-GDP ratio remained surprisingly constant over 1995–97.16 However, as inflation fell and 
the real exchange rate began to flatten out in 1997–98, the underlying debt dynamics became more 
                                                     
13. In this connection, it is especially significant that some other FSU countries started growing in 1995. 
Indeed, in 1996, a majority of these countries began to recover, while Russia was still declining. 
14. The attractions of deficit spending were limited as long as there was a fairly direct, short-term link between 
additional spending and inflation. Once it became possible to finance deficits without more or less 
immediate inflationary consequences, the incentives for deficit spending increased. 
15. For details, see Woodruff (1999) and Tompson (1999). 
16. At the end of 1997, it stood at an apparently modest 55 per cent (26 per cent foreign, 28.4 per cent 
domestic). Kharas, Pinto and Ulatov (2001) calculate that in 1996 alone, real exchange-rate appreciation 
lowered the debt-to-GDP ratio by 8 per cent. 
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apparent. Secondly, the economic situation apparently began to improve in 1997. The re-election of the 
president in 1996 had significantly reduced political uncertainty, and a renewed structural reform drive in 
early 1997 gave a further boost to confidence. Officially recorded output began to recover, as production 
started to rise in export-oriented resource sectors. By that time, these sectors were to a large degree 
privately owned. The major asset-control contests had largely been resolved – partly in the wake of the 
loans for shares auctions – and the new private owners had begun to increase the efficiency with which 
their newly won holdings operated. Thirdly, increasing investor confidence, which brought about a shift to 
net capital inflows for a time, and the foreign exchange inflows generated by resource exports fed a 
consumption boom in a few regions, which contributed to a small increase in output even in many non-
resource based sectors. This gave rise to the widespread impression that Russia had finally made the 
transition from stabilisation to recovery. A financial boom began in Moscow, despite the fact that Russia’s 
industrial heartlands were still in a very dire state.  
 
Box 2. Comparison of output contraction with other transition countries 
The length and severity of Russia’s transition recession stand in marked contrast to the experiences of the 
‘Visegrad’ countries of Central Europe, where output began to recover around two years after the onset of reforms 
(Figure 1). This difference is partly attributable to greater political instability in the Russian case, which made policy 
less consistent and less credible, as well as to some avoidable policy errors. In particular, Russia suffered greatly from 
its failure to bring inflation down in a sustainable way in the first few years of the transition. This meant that the price 
Russia ultimately paid for stabilisation in terms of lost output was much higher. However, much of the explanation is 
probably to be found in the initial conditions for reform in Russia. The post-communist transformation was always likely 
to be more difficult in Russia than in Central Europe. One western study comparing Russia, China, Poland, Hungary 
and the Czech Republic with respect to three indicators of readiness for the market transition – structural 
misdevelopment, institutional preparedness for a market economy, and macroeconomic disequilibrium – concluded 
that Russia was by far the least prepared on all three dimensions.1 While the structural distortions of the Soviet 
economy were similar in kind to those that afflicted other post-communist economies, they were greater in the Soviet 
case than elsewhere, largely because so much of the Soviet Union’s basic industrialisation took place under central 
planning. Planners did not merely deform an existing industrial base; to a great extent, they created one from scratch, 
and they did so based on a set of priorities that were sharply at odds with the needs of an internationally integrated 
Russian market economy. The resulting industrial structure was almost comically inefficient in its use of resources and 
severely skewed towards defence and heavy industry. Much of the industrial capital stock was thus virtually worthless 
in any environment dominated by the market rather than the Plan. 
1. Ernst et al. (1995:7–13).  
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Source : UNECE, World Bank, Eurostat, IMF, Interstate statistical committee of the CIS, Goskomstat and national sources.
Figure 1. Real GDP growth
Annual percentage change
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The period of the ‘rouble corridor’ coincided with Russia’s most controversial privatisation sales  
While the bulk of Russian industry was at least part-privatised via the voucher scheme during 
1992-94, the state kept substantial stakes in what was considered to be the most valuable large enterprises. 
These were supposed to be sold for cash in a second phase of privatisation. It became clear relatively 
quickly, however, that there was little demand for those assets at the prices at which the authorities were 
trying to sell them – partly because of the risks posed by continuing economic and political instability and 
the prospect of a return to power by the communists, and partly because too many enterprises were 
effectively controlled by insiders who did not wish to see outside investors (whether foreign or domestic) 
acquire large stakes. Some of the largest enterprises in which the state had initially kept important stakes 
were privatised in two stages during 1995–97 through the highly controversial ‘loans for shares’ auctions. 
In these auctions, some of Russia’s most valuable enterprises (including several major oil companies and 
the non-ferrous metals giant Norilsk Nickel) were effectively transferred to a handful of well-connected 
financial-industrial groups for a fraction of their real value. In late 1995, the groups accepted state shares in 
the companies as collateral for loans extended to the government on the understanding that the lenders 
could realise the stakes if the loans were not repaid by 1 September 1996.17 It was clear all along that the 
state would not repay the loans; indeed, the 1996 budget contained no provision for this. It was equally 
clear that the stakes would not be realised in a manner advantageous to the government. The auctions were 
conducted by the collateral holders themselves, who consistently ensured that the bidding was non-
competitive and that the stakes were purchased by entities they controlled, at prices only slightly above the 
value of the loans. To take but one example, a 38 per cent stake in Norilsk Nickel was privatised for 
around USD170.1m, implying a value of just over USD447.6m for a company that at that time was 
generating an estimated USD1.2–1.5bn per year in export revenues.  
                                                     
17. The lenders were to recoup the funds owed to them by the government and 30 per cent of any privatisation 
revenues above the amount of the loan, with the state receiving the remaining 70 per cent. 
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The Asian crisis and falling commodity prices finally rendered the situation unsustainable 
By early 1998 the economic situation and especially the fixed exchange rate regime18 had become 
unsustainable. The structural reform offensive of early 1997 had quickly stalled, and the fiscal situation 
remained grave. Both the 1997 consumption boom, with the associated strong growth in imports, and the 
oil price drop in the aftermath of the Asian crisis, contributed to a strong deterioration in Russia’s external 
balance. When the current account turned negative in mid-1997, it became clear that the exchange rate was 
not only too high for a significant part of Russian industry, but also – given ingrained capital flight – too 
high to allow Russia’s economy to achieve external balance. Renewed efforts to sort out Russia’s messy 
state finances, bolstered by a new IMF package, brought some short-term relief, but the fundamentals 
remained unchanged, and capital again began to flow out rapidly. The interest rates that the Russian 
government had to pay on its short term debt skyrocketed, reaching triple digits in real terms as nervous 
investors reassessed Russia in the wake of the Asian crisis.19 By August 1998, the government was left 
with no choice but to accept a devaluation of the rouble. The devaluation was accompanied by a forced 
restructuring of short-term domestic debt – an effective default – and a moratorium on the payment of most 
private, non-sovereign foreign debt. The devaluation was meant to be limited. However, while a controlled 
devaluation might have been possible several months earlier, the authorities’ attempts to stabilise the 
rouble around a moderately devalued exchange rate had little credibility in the circumstances, and the 
rouble soon followed the stock market into free fall. In real terms, it hit bottom against the dollar in 
January 1999, at about half the pre-crisis level. By then it had fallen 75 per cent against the dollar in 
nominal terms in five months. 
In the immediate aftermath of the financial collapse, the economy virtually came to a standstill.  The 
banking sector had been heavily exposed to rouble-denominated government securities, as well as to the 
rouble in derivatives markets. It was therefore hit especially hard by the devaluation and default, and many 
private banks stopped operating, causing the payments system to seize up for a time. Inflation accelerated 
sharply, and many shops and restaurants simply closed up temporarily. While the CBR sought to unblock 
the payments system (mainly by injecting liquidity into Sberbank and some other systemically important 
and/or politically well connected banks) and to rescue the banking system, the government was virtually 
paralysed for several weeks, until a new cabinet could be formed. In the months that followed, however, 
the new government executed a massive fiscal adjustment. This adjustment was largely automatic: the 
government simply refrained from indexing expenditure commitments to reflect surging inflation, while 
nominal revenues rose rapidly. Politically, such an adjustment was probably possible only because the 
government really had very little choice in the matter. Substantial borrowing was virtually impossible 
following the default, and massive budget financing via the printing press would have led rapidly to 
hyperinflation. While the fiscal adjustment was crucial in stabilising the situation, the sharp fall in real 
wages after the devaluation, together with a large cut in real social spending resulted in a substantial drop 
in real household incomes, and poverty increased significantly. Imports also fell sharply as the prices of 
imported goods quadrupled in rouble terms, so the current account was soon showing a large surplus. 
                                                     
18 From mid-1995 until the end of 1997, Russia followed a crawling peg regime which allowed the rouble to 
fluctuate inside a narrow, very slowly depreciating band. The authorities abandoned the moving corridor in 
January 1998, when the fluctuation band was widened to 15 per cent but the central rate was to be fixed for 
three years at Rb6.2/$. 
19. Yields on several short-term Treasury (GKO) issues during the late spring and early summer exceeded 
100 per cent, rising to 130-150 per cent for some series in early July, even though inflation was in single 
digits. 
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The post-crisis recovery began sooner and has lasted longer than most observers expected 
Despite widespread pessimism about Russia’s prospects after the crisis, the economy started to 
recover fairly rapidly. Industrial production began to recover in October,20 and by early spring 1999, it had 
already surpassed the pre-crisis peaks of 1997. While growth was very broadly based, the recovery was 
initially strongest in those sectors that had been doing worst before the crisis – domestically oriented non-
resource sectors. This dramatic turnaround resulted mainly from the dramatic fall in wages and energy 
prices, in both real roubles and foreign currency terms, following the devaluation. This large initial decline 
in input costs allowed a significant share of Russian industry to become competitive and profitable again, 
while the sharp rise in the rouble prices of imported goods facilitated import substitution on a large scale. 
The improvement in the economic situation in the ‘real sector’ was also reflected in steadily declining 
levels of barter, arrears and non-payments as the economy became re-monetised. The early post-crisis 
years also saw a wave of sometimes very aggressive ownership consolidation, as though who had 
weathered the crisis sought to acquire assets cheaply, while exploiting the general confusion in the 
aftermath of the crisis to default with impunity on their more vulnerable creditors or to squeeze out 
minority share holders, via share dilutions or simply asset transfers from company to company. Some of 
today’s leading Russian champions of good corporate governance were among the most aggressive in 
employing the above-mentioned schemes after the crisis. Russian companies also became adept at 
exploiting the weaknesses of the 1998 bankruptcy law in order to execute hostile corporate takeovers on 
the cheap, a practice its most expert practitioners developed into an art form.21 Many of the large financial 
groups were also extremely adept at ‘restructuring’ failed banks in such a way as to shift as much of the 
value as possible into other vehicles, leaving the state and other creditors empty-handed.22 
While the devaluation kick-started the economy, a low exchange rate by itself was not the only reason 
for the post-crisis recovery. In 1994, much the same combination of factors – a weak rouble, cheap 
domestic energy prices and relatively high export prices for oil23 – had failed to prevent a 12 per cent drop 
in GDP and a fall of more than 20 per cent in industrial production. By 1999, however, liberalisation and 
privatisation, controversial and incomplete though they were, had facilitated the emergence of an economic 
system in which private enterprises could and did respond to the opportunity provided by the devaluation. 
The economy’s response to the devaluation and to the subsequent recovery in oil prices was in no small 
measure a product of the structural changes wrought during the 1990s. In this respect it is important to note 
that the economy began to grow strongly before oil prices started to recover. Improving terms of trade 
were undoubtedly helpful later on, but the initial post-crisis recovery was not dependent on, let alone 
driven by, oil-price increases. 
When comparing the Russian crisis of 1998 with similar crises elsewhere two features stand out. The 
recovery in Russia started unusually quickly after the crash, and it has proved unusually robust. The 
explanation to the first question is straightforward. The Russian banking system prior to the crisis was not 
performing the role of a normal banking system (transforming savings into loans), but was mainly playing 
                                                     
20. Industrial production, adjusted for both seasonal factors and workdays, rose by 5 per cent in October 
relative to September and a further 2.2 per cent in November relative to October. Seasonal adjustment of 
Russian data is notoriously difficult and such data should always be interpreted with caution. However, the 
fact that the growth continued on an upward path suggests that these numbers constituted neither a 
statistical aberration nor a ‘dead-cat bounce’.  
21.  See Lambert-Mogiliansky, Sonin and Zhuravskaya (2000) for details. To some extent, the use of 
bankruptcy as a takeover mechanism reflected the absence of a well functioning market in corporate 
control, which would have enabled acquisitions to be executed in a more ‘normal’ fashion. 
22. See Tompson (2000) on the use of ‘bridge banks’ to escape creditor demands during 1998–2000. 
23. Oil prices in 1994 were close to the levels of 1999 in real terms. 
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stock markets and investing in government securities. Therefore, the collapse of the banking system did not 
lead to any noticeable credit crunch in the real sector. Ultimately, the banking crisis had remarkably little 
impact on economic activity. The reasons for the length and strength of the recovery are less obvious. The 
– necessarily temporary – boost to economic activity resulting from an unsustainably low real exchange 
rate and artificially low internal energy prices in 1999/2000 was largely exhausted by 2001, as wages, 
energy prices and the real exchange rate had all increased significantly. It was in 2001 that the oil sector 
really took over as the main engine of growth. During 2001-03, Russian oil companies accounted for 
almost one quarter of GDP growth directly.24 Strongly increasing oil exports also drove the expansion in 
export volumes that allowed a consumption boom to unfold and to be sustained throughout the period 
without putting the external balance at risk.  
High prices and apparent security of property rights contributed to an oil-sector boom 
Although a number of developments in late 2003 and 2004 raised new concerns about the security of 
property rights, the perception that property rights had become sufficiently secure was one of the factors 
contributing to the recovery of investment in 2000–01, particularly in the oil sector.25 Strikingly, in 2000 
the growth of oil-sector investment was led by companies controlled by the state or by oil industry insiders. 
By contrast, oil companies owned by major financial groups (whose property rights were perceived as less 
secure) were investing only marginally more than in 1998. In 2001, however, as perceptions of the security 
of property rights further improved, the latter group of companies began rapidly increasing investment, 
soon reaching levels comparable with the former group. This investment led to a sharp increase in oil 
production and exports in subsequent years (Figure 2). Output growth, however, was uneven. From 1998 to 
2003, the large insider- and financial group-controlled companies increased output by roughly 45 per cent 
and 90 per cent respectively, while state-controlled companies increased output only marginally. 
1. Sibneft, TNK, YUKOS.
2. LUKOIL, Surgutneftegaz.
3. Bashneft, Rosneft, Tatneft. 
Source:  Ministry of Energy, InfoTEK, Rennaissance Capital estimates, RIANTEC, OECD calculations.
Figure 2. Oil sector compagnies : relative performance
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24. See Ahrend (2004a). 
25. Clearly, high oil prices were another major factor. 
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Since the state-owned companies barely grew, this means that Russia’s privately owned oil companies 
directly accounted for somewhere between one-fifth and one quarter of GDP growth (Figure 2). Taking 
into account the knock-on effects from oil-sector procurement and wages on domestic demand, the actual 
contribution of the private oil companies to economic growth was probably greater still. It is unlikely that 
Russia would have been able to grow at anything like the rates it has experienced in recent years had the 
private oil companies not raised investment, output and exports very rapidly. Moreover, the examples of 
the state-controlled oil companies and of other important state-controlled companies, especially in the gas 
and banking sector, would appear to suggest that Russia’s leading private oil companies would not have 
achieved the growth performance of the last few years if they had remained under state control. 
Prudent fiscal policies helped to sustain the recovery… 
The government’s single most important contribution to the expansion after 1998 was the adoption of 
a prudent fiscal stance – in sharp contrast to the pre-crisis period. The fiscal adjustment following the crisis 
was radical indeed: general government expenditures (including all levels of government and social funds) 
are now about 10 percentage points of GDP lower than before the crisis, while revenues relative to GDP 
have remained at roughly their pre-crisis levels.26 The federal budgets for 2000–04 were drafted to aim for 
surpluses based on conservative oil price assumptions. This approach not only delivered sizeable surpluses 
but also a budget that was balanced over the oil-price cycle. To be sure, fiscal responsibility was facilitated 
by growing revenues due to favourable terms of trade and strong growth. However, the government largely 
resisted the temptation to spend this windfall, instead using a significant part of it to repay debt and 
accumulate reserves in a stabilisation fund. The government also took advantage of the favourable fiscal 
situation to implement a comprehensive reform of the tax system, which would have been far more 
difficult under other circumstances. In addition, the authorities adopted a number of institutional reforms, 
including an overhaul of the budget code and the creation of a federal treasury, which improved both the 
fiscal policy process and the management of public expenditure. 
…while monetary policy has struggled to balance inflation and exchange-rate concerns 
Monetary policy in the years after the crisis was dominated by the pursuit of conflicting policy goals, 
and has de facto been very loose. The Central Bank of Russia (CBR) followed a policy aimed at gradually 
reducing inflation while limiting the real appreciation of the rouble in order not to endanger the 
competitiveness of Russian industry. Given large current account surpluses and decreasing net capital 
outflows, this determination to prevent the rouble from appreciating too rapidly increasingly compelled the 
CBR to intervene on the foreign exchange markets via large-scale foreign currency purchases. However, in 
the absence of efficient large-scale sterilisation tools27 the accumulation of reserves has led to very strong 
monetary expansion, which has increasingly conflicted with achieving disinflation. 
                                                     
26. In fact, cash revenues (and thus effective revenues) are substantially higher than they were before the 
crisis. Pre-crisis federal revenues amounting to 3.6-3.7 per cent of GDP and regional revenues of the order 
of roughly 6 per cent of GDP were non-cash revenues, consisting of bartered goods, offsets, bills of 
exchange and other money surrogates. Since the recorded value of these non-cash payments was often 
substantially greater than their real value, the shift to cash collections means that effective revenues have 
increased relative to GDP, even if nominal revenues have declined. 
27. Large-scale, longer-term monetary sterilisation was until recently impossible, as the CBR was unable to 
issue its own debt until late 2004. While the statute providing for the issue of CBR bonds was adopted in 
the 1990s, it was long ineffective, because the corresponding regulation was never issued by the now-
abolished securities commission. As a substitute, the CBR used government bonds from its portfolio in 
reverse repo operations, mainly for short-term sterilisation purposes. The question of short-term 
sterilisation became especially prominent in 2003, with a sharp increase in speculative short-term capital 
flows into and out of Russia.  
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Russian industry has raised productivity rapidly since the crisis  
Recent years have seen increasing cost pressure on Russian industrial enterprises: the exchange rate 
has appreciated steadily in real terms since early 2000 and wages have risen rapidly, while energy and 
transport tariffs, frozen for some time after the crisis, have been rising at well above the rate of inflation 
since 2000. So far, much of Russian industry seems to have done relatively well in maintaining 
competitiveness despite these pressures. While industrial production growth slowed in 2001-02, it 
recovered to around 6–7 per cent in 2003–04. The main reason for this resilience – apart from the dominant 
role of the oil sector – appears to be significant labour productivity increases in a large majority of sectors. 
Average industrial labour productivity has been increasing strongly and steadily since 1997 (with the 
exception of 1998), and the average increase between 1997 and 2003 was around 8 per cent. The 
performances of different sectors have varied widely, but there have been improvements in almost all of 
them. The few inglorious exceptions (Figure 3) turn out to be sectors in which there is still significant 
direct state control over enterprises or extensive state interference in economic activity. The productivity 
performance of the grain-processing and bread sectors, as well as oil (before 1999) and electricity (until 
2002), is uninspiring. The gas industry is not so much at the bottom of the league as in a league of its own. 
* Data on labour productivity for 1997-2002.
Source:  Russian Federal Service for State Statistics and OECD calculations.
Figure 3. Labour productivity : changes in the 30 most important industrial sectors
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There are indications that there has been a shift to more active restructuring in recent years (Figure 4). 
While there were even some productivity increases in the period to 1998, they mainly resulted from 
passive restructuring in pursuit of short-term survival. Enterprises tried to reduce employment as output 
fell. Then, during 1999-2001, there was what may best be described as a ‘recovery’. Productivity 
increased, but in aggregate this was mainly a by-product of increasing production. There were, of course, 
enterprises and sectors that restructured very deeply during this period, but it appears that many contented 
themselves with increasing output, and in aggregate there were no further reductions in industrial 
employment. It was in 2002, when it became clear that the ‘easy’ gains from the devaluation had been 
exhausted, that large numbers of enterprises finally began restructuring with a view to improving 
productivity. In 2002-04, industrial output grew relatively strongly while industrial employment fell. Thus, 
despite rapidly rising wages, unit labour costs (ULCs) in industry in 2003 remained about 25 per cent 
below the levels of 1997, although wages were significantly higher. The major exception to this trend was, 
again, the gas sector, where ULCs were about 107 per cent above pre-crisis levels. 
 
Source:  Russian Federal Service for State Statistics and OECD calculations.
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The post-crisis expansion has coincided with a period of renewed structural reform 
The 1998 financial collapse was the product of unsustainable macroeconomic imbalances that were to 
some degree the result of a lack of progress with respect to structural reforms after about 1993. The fragile 
macroeconomic stabilisation of 1995–98 was never underpinned by the micro-level structural changes 
needed to render it sustainable without massive infusions of external financial support. In particular, the 
authorities proved unwilling to impose hard budget constraints on large firms, which continued to receive 
substantial implicit and explicit subsidies.28 Ultimately, macroeconomic stability cannot last where firms 
are not subject to hard budget constraints. To say this is not to minimise the significance of the external 
shocks that hit Russia as the Asian crisis spread in 1997–98 or to downplay the importance of fiscal 
weakness. The point is rather that the lack of structural reform increased Russia’s vulnerability to the Asian 
typhoon. Structural reform failures also cost the state budget dearly and thus contributed to a rapid, and 
ultimately unsustainable, growth of state debt. After the crisis, therefore, the government renewed its 
efforts to press ahead with long-delayed structural reforms in spheres ranging from taxation to electricity to 
banking (see Box 3). 
Box 3. Structural reform progress since the crisis 
In legislative terms, at least, the period since 1999 has witnessed considerable progress on structural reform.1 
Perhaps the first important post-crisis achievement was the passage of part 2 of the new Tax Code in 2000, albeit 
without the chapters on the profit tax and resource taxes, which were adopted the following year. Land reform, which 
had been stalled throughout the 1990s, moved forward with unfreezing of chapter of 17 of the Civil Code, which 
governs property relations with respect to land, although agricultural land was excluded from its provisions.2 This 
followed by a new land code and a new law on the purchase and sale of agricultural land. The new labour code 
reached the statute books in 2001, as did a trio of bills aimed at reducing bureaucratic interference in the economy, 
and the major elements of the government’s judicial reform. The basic legislation on pension reform was adopted in 
December 2001, with additional legislation following in 2002–03. A new law on combating money laundering 
authorised the creation of a new body for monitoring questionable financial transactions. Though initially criticised by 
many observers as too weak, the money-laundering law was subsequently strengthened and Russia was in 2002 
removed from the FATF’s list of states that fail to combat money laundering. The authorities adopted a number of 
measures to improve the framework for corporate governance in 2001–02, including new laws on bankruptcy and joint-
stock companies and a corporate governance code, which broadly reflects the OECD Principles of Corporate 
Governance. The 2002–03 period also saw the adoption of new laws on currency controls (phasing out almost all 
capital controls); a new law on technical regulation; a new customs code; and the government’s electricity reform 
package. While the pace of legislative activity slowed somewhat in 2004, the government did continue its reform of the 
tax and budget codes, particularly with respect to fiscal federal relations. 
Altogether, this legislative record represents a considerable achievement, particularly in view of the large number 
of contentious measures passed in 2002–03, when the opposition of entrenched special interests and the approach of 
parliamentary and presidential elections made the government’s task much more difficult. On the whole, the new laws, 
whatever their imperfections are an undoubted improvement on the legislation they have replaced. In some cases, the 
new legislation does not replace anything but rather fills gaps in the legal frameworks governing various spheres of 
activity. Russian commercial law in many spheres is now of very high quality. However, improvements in the quality of 
legislation have not yet been matched by improvements in the quality of the institutions that implement the law or those 
that resolve legal disputes and enforce the law. The weakness, inefficiency and, in many cases, corruption of the 
courts, the law enforcement agencies and of the state administration thus constitute the most important obstacles to 
realising further progress in improving the framework conditions for business in Russia. Judicial reform itself 
exemplifies this problem: a major overhaul of the various codes of judicial procedure and of the framework laws 
governing the judiciary was completed in 2001, and did indeed result in substantial improvements in the quality of the 
law itself. However, there has been little evidence to date that the functioning of the courts has really improved much. 
Similarly, the positive impact of the trio of laws adopted in 2001 to reduce the bureaucratic burden on business has 
been limited, chiefly because the officials affected by the legislation resisted its effective implementation. 
                                                     
28. For an excellent analysis of the authorities’ attempts to pursue stabilisation without imposing hard budget 
constraints, see Pinto, Drebentsov and Morozov (2000).   
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That said, structural reform progress has not by any means been limited to legislation alone. The authorities have 
since 2000 been engaged in the painful but necessary process of rebalancing domestic and international rail tariffs and 
of raising the tariffs charged by the country’s electricity, natural gas and rail transport monopolies. The implementation 
of pension reform began in 2003, although it soon encountered difficulties that led to some amendment of the reforms. 
Finally, two crucial and long-delayed reform processes have begun to move forward since 2001: reform of the power 
sector and banking reform. Both are meeting serious resistance and are moving less quickly than proponents would 
like, but the progress of the last three years has been dramatic indeed by comparison with the preceding decade, 
when both electricity and banking reform were repeatedly postponed. Moreover, despite numerous delays and political 
compromises, the pace of reform in both sectors since the beginning of 2002 compares relatively favourably with the 
speed at which similar reforms have been executed in other emerging market economies. That said, developments 
since early 2004 have given cause for concern. To their credit, the authorities managed to press ahead with a number 
of structural reforms through the 2003–04 electoral cycle, but the post-election period, which many observers had 
expected to see a sharp acceleration of structural reform, has in fact witnessed a marked slowdown in progress with 
respect to a number of important structural reforms and, in some cases, movement away from the programme of 
liberal reforms to which the government had been committed since 2000.  
1. For details, see OECD (2004a), Annex 1.A2.  
2. When the code was adopted in 1995, the suspension of this highly controversial chapter 17 had been the price the 
government paid to get it through a Duma dominated by opponents of land reform.  
 
Strikingly, while reform in many other areas accelerated after the crisis, the pace of privatisation 
slowed markedly. This was partly because the most attractive assets had been substantially privatised by 
then. This made further sales even more difficult, for two reasons. First, the political struggles over the 
remaining prime assets were intensified. Secondly, there was little demand for residual state shareholdings 
in otherwise attractive companies that were already controlled by a private owner or group of owners. At 
the same time, the state was left with a large number of less attractive assets, which have not been easy to 
sell. Moreover, the privatisation scandals of 1995–97 followed by the financial crisis of 1998 and the 
political uncertainties of 1999–2000 all served to slow the process.  
The period after 2000 saw some improvements in both investor sentiment and the state’s performance 
in the field of privatisation, but these changes were limited. In principle, major sales should now take place 
on a transparent, competitive basis, with mechanisms designed to maximise the sale price realised by the 
state. However, there have been few such sales. Year after year, ambitious privatisation programmes are 
unveiled but not implemented, and many of the sales that have gone ahead have been extremely 
controversial. Transparency and competition continue to be limited. In some cases, the authorities have 
ended up re-writing the terms of privatisation sales in the middle of the process, which has done little to 
enhance either government credibility or investor confidence. While sale prices are a good deal higher than 
in the shares-for-loans era, there is still a widespread perception that the winners in major privatisation 
competitions are usually determined in advance – and that they are already close to the companies they are 
buying. The most notable exceptions to this rule have involved assets being contested by rival business 
groupings. Ironically, this means that the most ‘successful’ privatisation sales in revenue terms are often 
among the most politicised and controversial.29 
                                                     
29. The two most striking examples of this tendency are the Svyazinvest sale of the summer of 1997 and the 
sale in 2001 of a stake in Kuzbassugol. Though hardly one of the most promising industrial concerns in 
Russia, the sale of 80 per cent of Kuzbassugol fetched a price that valued it more highly than some of the 
resource giants sold off in the shares-for-loans scam of the mid-1990s. The lesson seems to be that rivalry 
among Russia’s commercial ‘oligarchs’ contributes more to the success of privatisation than the 
competence of the privatisation authorities themselves. However, such rivalries mean that the most 
competitive – and lucrative – privatisations have sometimes given rise to the biggest scandals. The political 
fallout from the Svyazinvest scandal hardly enhanced the incentives for the authorities to conduct fair, 
transparent sales: the Svyazinvest deal provoked a fierce battle among Russia’s business clans that 
ultimately led to the resignation of several senior officials. 
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II. The impact of structural reforms to date 
The section that follows offers an assessment of the contribution of economic reforms to Russian 
economic performance. It is, of course, notoriously difficult to quantify the contribution of this or that 
reform on economic outcomes. Many of the judgements that follow are therefore somewhat tentative. 
However, the evidence does suggest that together with responsible macroeconomic management, structural 
reforms in Russia have laid the basis for the robust growth of recent years. There remains, of course, much 
to be done, and the main challenges for Russia today are outlined in later sections. First, however, it is 
important to assess in detail the contribution of structural reform to Russian economic performance so far. 
More than a decade of transformation has transformed the structure of ownership…  
Perhaps the most dramatic structural change of the post-Soviet period – and certainly the most striking 
at first glance – has been the rapid shift to an economy based on private property. By 2002, the private 
share of total employment had risen to 63 per cent. The private sector now accounts for an estimated 70 per 
cent of GDP,30 including about two-thirds of industrial production. The official data for 2002 show 
enterprises in private Russian and foreign ownership accounting for 66.2 per cent of industrial production, 
with wholly state-owned and municipal enterprises accounting for just 9.5 per cent. The nature of the 
state’s continuing role as a property owner is reflected in the 24.3 per cent share produced by enterprises 
with mixed state-private ownership. 
The structure of private property that has emerged since 1992 is dominated by a relatively small 
number of large industrial groups, most of which are tightly controlled by a small number of core 
shareholders and organised around some commodity exporting business. Recent research suggests that the 
ten largest industrial groups, together with the state-controlled national gas and electricity companies, 
account for roughly half of Russian industrial output.31 These groupings have in recent years tended to 
pursue strategies of vertical integration. Such strategies are in part a rational response to the potential 
uncertainties and risks connected with enforcing contracts with third parties in the Russian legal 
environment. Moreover, industry consolidation has yielded benefits in terms of enterprise performance. In 
contrast to the remaining large state-owned companies, the privately held industrial groups have generally 
restructured the businesses they owned or acquired in recent years and most of them are fairly well 
managed. The productivity of many private industrial groups’ enterprises has been increasing briskly, and 
in general they have outpaced industry as a whole in terms of restructuring.32 While expanding into new 
sectors, most of these groupings remain heavily focused on their core businesses. Expansion tends to be 
into sectors closely related to their core businesses.33 The fact that most of the groupings are based on 
commodity export businesses operating in competitive global markets means that consolidation offers 
them economies of scale and makes it easier for them to compete alongside large non-Russian players in 
the same sectors.  
Nevertheless, this concentration of ownership may pose issues for competition policy. The groupings’ 
growth appears to be driven largely by a desire to monopolise entire sectors, or even groups of related 
sectors. This is especially true of the most recent wave of industrial consolidation. Whereas in the 1990s, 
banks and cash-rich resource companies simply bought up whatever they could as fast as they could, M&A 
                                                     
30. EBRD (2003:186). This is an EBRD estimate; the Russian statistical authorities do not publish data on the 
private-sector share of GDP.  
31. Dynkin (2004). 
32. See also Boone and Rodionov (2002). 
33. See Dynkin (2004). 
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activity since the crisis – and especially since 2000 – has been characterised by a determination to create 
vertically integrated structures.34 Often companies with monopoly or near-monopoly positions in one 
sector sought to use their market power to extend their reach up- or down-stream into related sectors. This 
has been a feature of the behaviour of some state-owned companies as well as some of some large private 
ones. Given the large number of sectors that are dominated by a few large enterprises, securing dominant 
positions in major sectors is relatively easy to do in Russia.  
While such consolidation may threaten to suppress competition in product markets, it is important to 
understand that many of these markets were not very competitive to begin with – a factor which has itself 
been a major impetus to pursue vertical integration. The industrial structure inherited from the Soviet 
Union was characterised by particularly ‘long chains of dependence’, lacking the ‘resilience and flexibility 
built on redundancy in markets’.35 This lack of alternative suppliers and customers left enterprises 
vulnerable and one response was to seek security by taking direct control of up- and down-stream 
activities. The impetus for metals producers to secure control of upstream coal and automobile enterprises, 
for example, largely reflected the limited options they faced when sourcing their energy supplies or 
marketing their output.36 Many major industrial sectors may thus face a future of monopoly domination or 
oligopolistic competition, in which the main players may compete with each other – more in the political 
arena than the commercial – but will be strongly tempted to collude to exclude new entrants or to 
manipulate prices. In this situation, there will clearly be a need for stronger competition policy, but the 
extent to which producers are subject to competitive pressures will also depend to a very great extent on 
the international openness of the economy. This is a major reason why Russia’s entry into the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) is so important to the success of economic reform: it should entrench the openness of 
the economy and make it harder for domestic players to suppress competition. 
…as well as the structure of production, employment and foreign trade 
In addition to changes in ownership, the early 1990s witnessed an important shift in the production 
structure of the economy, especially within the industrial sector. The output of natural resource-based 
sectors fell by roughly 40 per cent during 1992–94, while that of other industrial sectors declined by 
roughly 60 per cent on the official data. The weight of natural resources in the economy increased 
accordingly. There was also a significant shift from goods production towards the service sector, which 
had been neglected by Soviet planners. However, this shift was far less dramatic than it appears in the 
official data. This is because a significant share of value added in export-oriented resource sectors shows 
up in the official statistics under services (wholesale trade, in particular), as a result of the transfer pricing 
employed by major resource exporters. Figure 5 shows the structure of the economy as it appears in the 
official data and a depiction based on an alternative set of weights computed by the World Bank in an 
effort to correct for transfer pricing.37 The services sector now accounts for around 46 per cent of GDP, as 
                                                     
34. As a rule, the groups formed in the mid-1990s set about rationalising their structures, abandoning some 
activities to concentrate on others.   
35. Ericson (1998:622). 
36. The coal concern Kuzbassugol provides an excellent case in point. A medium-sized company in a not 
especially promising sector, it fetched more than $180m when it was privatised in the autumn of 2001. The 
price of Kuzbassugol was driven up by the rivalry between steel concerns Severstal and Evrazkholding, 
each of which feared the consequences of allowing the other to control Kuzbassugol. 
37. Here and elsewhere in this chapter, the data on Russia’s economic structure and on the contribution of 
various sectors to growth differ from the official Russian data. The numbers given here are based on the 
adjusted sectoral weights estimated by the World Bank in an attempt to correct for the distorted picture of 
Russia’s economic structure that results from the widespread use of transfer pricing. For details, see OECD 
(2004a:28–9) and World Bank (2004). 
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against an estimated 36 per cent in 1990, with market services accounting for most of the growth. At the 
same time, the share of industry has fallen from around 54 per cent to about 41 per cent. The share of raw-
materials-producing sectors in industrial output and exports has risen sharply, while that of processing 
industries has contracted.  
Source
 : Goskomstat, World Bank and OECD calculations.
GDP  2003, current basic prices GDP  2003, current basic prices, WB weighted
Figure 5. Structure of GDP
A. Official weights B. Adjusted weights
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Changes in the structure of production were mirrored by changes in the labour market. According to 
one Russian study, more than 40 per cent of the workforce changed profession during 1991–98, two-thirds 
of them doing so during 1991–95.38 Industry’s share in total employment fell by 12 percentage points 
between 1990 and 2002, from 42.3 per cent to 30.3 per cent.39 In fact, the drop in the absolute level of 
industrial employment was even greater than this figure suggests, since total employment fell by 12.8 per 
cent over the same period. There were also important relative shifts within industry. Sectors that were not 
very productive (and often hugely loss-making) reduced employment, sometimes significantly, whereas 
sectors that were doing comparatively well (i.e. mainly export oriented, natural resource-based sectors) 
roughly maintained, or sometimes even increased employment.40 The service sector’s share in total 
employment rose from 42.1 per cent in 1990 to 55.9 per cent in 2002. Nevertheless, although employment 
in market services grew faster than any other sector – its share rose from 16.7 to 26.6 per cent over the 
period – the bulk of service-sector employment is still in non-market services, which accounted for 
29.3 per cent of total employment in 2002, up from 25.4 per cent in 1990. Given that the output of non-
market services sectors fell in absolute terms and relative to GDP over the period, this increase would 
appear to reflect a lack of restructuring and the desire of some part of the labour force to escape the rigours 
of the market, rather than the dynamism of this sector.  
                                                     
38. Gimpel’son and Kapelyushnikov (2004).  
39. The data in this paragraph are taken from World Bank (2004:51). 
40. Employment in the natural gas sector rose dramatically, although there was no corresponding increase in 
output, which largely stagnated. See Ahrend (2004b) for details. 
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Russia’s trade structure has also undergone substantial changes, particularly in terms of its geographic 
orientation. The break-up of the USSR and the subsequent liberalisation of trade were accompanied by a 
massive re-orientation of trade flows away from the former Soviet Union (FSU) to non-FSU countries. 
This shift was reinforced by the break-up of the rouble zone, as well as the difficult economic 
circumstances many of these new states and their enterprises found themselves in. Whereas 26.7 per cent 
of Russian exports went to other CIS states in 1993, and fully 30.0 per cent of imports originated in other 
CIS republics, the corresponding figures for 2003 were just 15.7 and 21.0 per cent respectively.41 The 
export and import shares of former communist states in Central and Eastern Europe both fell sharply in the 
1990s: the region’s share in Russian exports fell from 14.3 to around 10 per cent, while its share of imports 
fell by almost half, from just over 13 per cent to around 7.3 per cent. The share of exports to, and imports 
from, OECD countries rose markedly over the same period, particularly the import share.  
The fall in trade with other former Soviet states and Eastern Europe was linked to shifts in the 
commodity structure of Russian trade. On the export side, this reorientation proved especially painful for 
Russian manufacturers, as their products were generally uncompetitive on western markets. Basic 
commodities – chiefly hydrocarbons, but also metals, timber, pulp and paper, mineral fertilisers and 
diamonds – already dominated Russia’s export structure at the start of the market transformation, and this 
reliance on primary products increased over the post-Soviet period, leaving Russia with a very high 
commodity concentration of exports (Figure 6). The share of machinery and equipment in total exports fell 
from almost 20 per cent at the end of the Soviet period to under 8 per cent in 2003. This decline would 
have been even more precipitous had it not been for the recovery in arms exports after the mid-1990s. 
Moreover, an increasing share of Russia’s exports consist of mineral products and semi-finished goods 
whose production is highly energy intensive and also involves significant environmental externalities; 
examples include base metals and chemicals, as well as cellulose and paper products. Rising domestic 
energy prices are reducing the competitiveness of many of these exports, while any serious effort to raise 
environmental standards could reduce the price competitiveness of many such products. On the import 
side, the most visible shifts include a sharp increase in the shares of food and consumer goods in the total 
import bill – while the share of machinery and transportation equipment remains quite large, it now 
consists largely of consumer electronics and passenger autos rather than investment goods.  
                                                     
41. Data for 1993 are used for the first year of liberalised trade, partly because the 1992 data are incomplete 
and of poor quality but also because trade was so severely disrupted in the months following the Soviet 
collapse, that the 1992 figures are clearly a sharp aberration from the trade patterns seen before or since. 
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Source:  United nations, Commodity Trade Statistics Database (COMTRADE), SITC Rev 3.
Figure  6. Structure of Exports, 2003
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Price liberalisation, though painful, has brought significant benefits 
It is difficult to exaggerate the impact of the initial price liberalisation undertaken in 1992. Rapid price 
liberalisation was intended to ending the chronic shortages resulting from artificially low regulated prices 
for most goods and services, as well as to absorb the monetary overhang described above. Most important 
of all, price liberalisation was essential if prices were to begin to perform their ‘normal’ function of 
providing information about the interaction of supply and demand, thereby creating new incentives for 
production and investment. Despite widespread scepticism about the ability of enterprises to respond to 
price signals, the evidence suggests that they did indeed respond fairly rapidly, adjusting prices and output 
in response to feedback from the market in the form of price changes. Queues and the shortages that gave 
rise to them disappeared, while the structure of production and employment began to change rapidly. The 
subsequent rapid development of the private trade and service sectors, which had been neglected under 
central planning, owed much to the signals generated by free prices. Price liberalisation thus resulted in a 
dramatic improvement in the availability of goods and services that had been difficult or impossible to 
obtain prior to the reforms. However, low purchasing power put strict limits on what was affordable to 
most of the population and the impact of liberalisation on different social groups varied a great deal. This 
reflected not only the effects of inflation but also the fact that some individuals and groups had simply 
been better positioned than others to obtain scarce goods under the old system of administered allocation. 
This advantage disappeared with the shift to allocation by the market rather than bureaucratic fiat. 
Price liberalisation also offered a way to protect the integrity of a still fragile Russian Federation and 
to help reconstitute Russia as a unified economic space. In late 1991, the centrifugal tendencies that had 
contributed to the break-up of the Soviet Union also appeared to be threatening Russia. The breakdown of 
the Soviet system had not replaced administrative allocation with market allocation. Instead, it had 
devolved administrative power to regional and local governments, which had responded to – and 
aggravated – the country’s worsening shortages by setting up their own trade barriers and taking over the 
management of their local economies in the pursuit of self-sufficiency. The federal government was no 
longer able to ensure that the capital was supplied with food and goods, and Russia’s economy had begun 
to fragment. Price liberalisation helped to address this challenge: barter and administrative allocation began 
to decline and money to matter, creating powerful incentives for agents to circumvent territorial 
administrative barriers if they could. The growing role of money also enhanced the authority of the federal 
centre, owing to its control over monetary policy. In August 1992, the government claimed, with some 
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justice, that these changes had strengthened the federation vis-à-vis the regions.42 This declaration of 
victory in the struggle to reassert central authority and make Russia a single economic space was 
undoubtedly premature, but it was not by any means without foundation. The concern with Russia’s 
economic fragmentation forms an important, if often overlooked part of the story of price liberalisation, 
which helped to open up local product markets and to facilitate the flow of goods and services throughout 
the country.43  
The liberalisation process was, to be sure, extremely difficult for enterprises and households, and 
would have been even if the authorities had managed quickly to stabilise the overall price level. After all, 
the move from a system in which the allocation of goods owed more to rationing mechanisms than to 
purchasing power involved both winners and losers in relative terms; moreover, some of those, such as 
pensioners, who had lost out under the shift from queuing and rationing to price-based allocation were also 
more affected by continuing high inflation even after the initial adjustment. The ‘big bang’ nature of the 
initial liberalisation package has therefore attracted much criticism. However, as noted above, the system 
of fixed prices had more or less broken down by late 1991, raising questions about the feasibility of a more 
‘gradualist’ approach. Moreover, the big bang of January 1992 was not as sweeping as is sometimes 
supposed. Many more prices were freed two months later, but the remaining national-level controls on 
hydrocarbons and other basic commodities had knock-on effects on other markets, and regional authorities 
were permitted to introduce local controls, which most did. Energy prices, in particular, continued to be 
regulated, for fear that a rapid convergence between domestic and international energy prices would 
bankrupt large swathes of industry.44 As a result, an estimated 30 per of GDP was still covered by price 
controls in 1995 (OECD, 1995:27).  
Liberalisation of foreign trade and FDI has benefited consumers and increased competition 
Although the initial liberalisation of foreign trade involved some fairly dramatic measures, trade 
policy was used in a number of spheres to hold down the domestic prices of key industrial inputs once 
price controls had been removed. In many cases, the differentials between the domestic and international 
prices for such goods actually increased. Most important among these commodities were oil and gas; they 
were also the commodities on which such export restrictions (in the form of quotas and taxes) were kept in 
place the longest. Price regulation, export tariffs and quotas, and formulae for allocating access to export 
pipelines have all been used to hold down internal prices of these two fuels. As a result, at the beginning of 
2002 – a decade after the initial ‘big bang’ price liberalisation – the domestic price of oil was still under 
30 per cent of the world market price of Urals crude and the average domestic wholesale price of natural 
gas was about 12.5 per cent of the export price. In the early stages of transition, there were also import 
controls on many commodities, as well as subsidised imports of some necessities. Thus, Russia began the 
transition with an extraordinarily open import regime but heavily regulated exports. This quickly began to 
change, however. As the rouble strengthened and protectionist pressures increased, Russia developed an 
increasingly complex import tariff structure – by the mid-1990s, it included tariff definitions for around 
3,500 product categories. This complex and cumbersome system gave rise to much corruption, particularly 
because officials had the opportunity to misclassify more heavily taxed goods into lower-tariff categories. 
The consequences of this continued over-regulation of foreign trade were serious. The fiscal costs of 
import subsidies and the remaining price controls were one of the major reasons why macroeconomic 
                                                     
42. Izvestiya, 19 August 1992. 
43. For one of the few serious analyses of the impact of price liberalisation on centre-periphery relations, see 
Woodruff (1996). 
44. Accustomed to energy prices held at around 10 per cent of world levels and little concerned with cost-
minimisation, Soviet industrial enterprises were fantastically energy-inefficient.    
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stabilisation proved so difficult in the early 1990s. Controls on exports and imports also created enormous 
opportunities for both official corruption and highly profitable arbitrage operations by those in a position to 
exploit them. The wealth and influence of the officials and entrepreneurs involved in such activity, 
moreover, tended to strengthen the resistance to further liberalisation. As a result, many of the steps toward 
further trade liberalisation envisaged in the government’s February 1992 policy memorandum were never 
implemented. It is difficult to escape the conclusion that the liberalisation of exports and the elimination of 
subsidies and quotas on imports were too slow and too limited – not too rapid.  
Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to exaggerate the impact of these shortcomings. On the whole, 
Russia has benefited from a fairly consistent process of trade liberalisation over the last dozen years or so, 
a process underpinned in recent years by its determination to enter the WTO. At the same time, policy 
became more ‘normal’ during the 1990s, as exports were gradually liberalised while import-competing 
sectors secured a degree of protection from foreign competition. Russian import tariffs are relatively low 
by international standards – the simple, unweighted average was around 10.8 per cent in 2002 – and its 
tariff structure increasingly resembles those of OECD countries. The overly complex tariff structure that 
had evolved in the 1990s underwent a fundamental overhaul at the end of 2000. At the start of 2001, over 
30 per cent of products were classified into just four categories with tariff rates of 5 per cent, 10 per cent, 
15 per cent and 20 per cent. Although a few products, including cars, sugar, alcohol and tobacco, continued 
to be taxed at rates well above 20 per cent, these changes brought the average rate down to 11-12 per cent. 
Over time, the number of ‘peaks’ in the tariff schedule has declined; there are relatively few tariffs now 
above 15 per cent.45 These changes do appear to have reduced import misclassification, thereby reducing at 
least one form of corrupt behaviour in the customs service. Moreover, the simplification of tariff schedules 
and the legal requirement that tariffs be revised no more than twice a year have made tariff policy more 
transparent and predictable.  
Russia eliminated many formal obstacles to foreign investment in the earliest stages of the market 
transformation, opening up the economy to foreign investment after a period of 75 years during which it 
had been almost entirely closed to outside investment. A further push to improve the legislative framework 
governing foreign investment – and foreign direct investment (FDI) in particular – was undertaken after the 
1998 financial crisis. A law on foreign investment was adopted in 1999 and amended in 2002 and 2003. It 
establishes, inter alia, the principle of national treatment for foreign investors and their right to engage in 
any form of investment activity allowed by law. It also guarantees investors compensation in the event of 
expropriation and authorises the repatriation of profits. Nevertheless, sector-specific formal restrictions 
remain in a number of important fields of activity, including insurance, banking, mass media, aviation, 
land transport, agricultural land, electric power and natural gas.  
While foreign trade has grown strongly in recent years and has made an important contribution to 
sustaining the economic expansion,46 levels of FDI have so far been disappointing, despite the 
liberalisation described above. The cumulative stock of FDI in Russia totalled just USD 26bn at the end of 
2003, equal to just about half the annual FDI inflows to China during 2002 and 2003. Russia’s stock of 
FDI is also well below that of the more advanced transition countries, in both absolute and per capita 
terms. FDI inflows into Russia amounted to just USD 26.7 per capita in 2002, as compared with figures of 
USD 88.6 for Hungary, 106.1 for Poland and 817.8 for the Czech Republic.47 Such low levels of FDI are a 
problem, for at least two reasons. First, overall investment rates are still relatively low. Despite a 
significant recovery in 2001–03, gross fixed capital formation amounted to just about 20 per cent of GDP 
                                                     
45. There are, however, far fewer duty-free lines than would typically be found in an OECD economy. See 
Kalinova (2005) for details. 
46. On the importance of exports for Russian growth, see OECD (2004a:34–5, 56–7). 
47. OECD (2004b:29).  
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in 2003, slightly below the OECD average and well below the levels found in fast-growing emerging 
economies. Secondly, Bessonova et al. (2003) find that competition with imports and with firms that have 
benefited from FDI has a positive impact on the productivity of domestic firms. FDI flow flows are 
increasing, to be sure: according to data from the Federal Service for State Statistics (FSGS), gross FDI 
inflows rose to just under USD 6.8bn in 2003, after having fluctuated in the range of USD 4.0–4.4bn 
throughout 1999–2002. Preliminary data for 2004 show a further increase of about 40 per cent year on 
year, reflecting partly the desire of foreign investors to enter a fast-growing market and partly also 
international oil companies’ drive to replenish their reserves by acquiring stakes in Russian oil companies. 
This is still a fairly modest inflow, given Russia’s size, and it must be set alongside evidence of a 
slowdown in overall investment growth in 2004. Domestic investors, unsettled by signs of deterioration in 
the investment climate, were cutting back on investment in Russia in favour of acquiring assets abroad.  
It is extremely difficult to quantify the impact of trade reform or opening up to FDI on economic 
performance. OECD (2001:9–10) observes that there is a positive association between trade openness and 
growth in transition countries but stops short of asserting a causal link between the two, as there is no 
simple way to isolate the effects of trade/investment liberalisation from those of other policies, let alone 
from the movement of macroeconomic variables such as the exchange rate and shifts in the terms of trade. 
There is, however, a strong consensus in both theoretical and empirical work in recognising the importance 
of trade in fostering economic growth, particularly by diffusing technological progress, making it possible 
to exploit economies of scale and enhancing competition. The significance of the last of these factors is all 
the greater in the Russian case in view of the highly concentrated structure of many sectors of the Russian 
economy. Foreign competition for product markets has a critical role to play in safeguarding competition 
while preserving the efficiency gains that can flow from industrial consolidation.  
As noted above, such empirical work as has been done on Russian trade and FDI liberalisation to date 
suggests that they have had a positive effect on domestic firms. In particular, Bessonova et al. (2003) find 
on the basis of firm-level data that the increased availability of imported inputs helped improve the 
productivity of domestic firms during 1995–2001 (although the 1998 rouble devaluation did hit firms 
dependent on foreign inputs) and that competition with foreign imports and with goods produced by 
foreign-owned firms in Russia does lead to faster restructuring of domestic enterprises. However, they also 
argue that the benefits of trade and FDI liberalisation depend on other policies, including financial sector 
reform, measures to improve labour mobility and reductions in regional bureaucracy. These conclusions 
dovetail with the analysis of industrial competitiveness presented in OECD (2004a), which draws attention 
to the impressive productivity improvements recorded in sectors with exceptionally high levels of foreign 
participation. Yet while FDI has in some cases brought significant benefits to specific sectors or localities, 
it has so far been too small to contribute much to overall economic growth: even at regional level, there 
appears to be no significant relationship between FDI inflows and growth.48  
Russia’s privatisation policies have attracted much criticism 
Privatisation has proved to be the most controversial major strand of reform. Before examining its 
impact, therefore, it is crucial to ‘put privatisation in its place’. One of the major lessons to emerge from 
the experience of Russia and other transition countries has been that the significance of privatisation on its 
own was greatly exaggerated at the beginning of the market transformation. The effects of privatisation 
depend hugely on context and are thus inextricably linked to changes in the wider economic environment. 
In particular, they depend on the imposition of hard budget constraints on enterprises, as well as on 
developments with respect to competition policy, changes in corporate governance and the development of 
capital markets and other institutions favouring the emergence of a competitive, smoothly functioning 
market in corporate control. Thus, Angelucci et al. (2002), using data from a large enterprise-level panel 
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designed to address the determinants of privatised enterprise performance in Russia, find strong 
complementarities between four factors that, taken together contribute to significant improvements in 
enterprise performance: private ownership; good corporate governance; market structures and competition; 
and hard budget constraints. This confirms the view that these factors need to be considered jointly. While 
some critics have tended to attribute Russia’s economic travails in the 1990s to flawed privatisation, the 
evidence actually suggests that the impact of privatisation on performance was positive.  
That said, the privatisation mechanisms employed in Russia undoubtedly created problems of their 
own and are hardly above criticism. Voucher privatisation did succeed in transferring ownership out of the 
hands of the state, which had proved to be an extremely inefficient owner. However, the resulting structure 
of ownership reflected political necessity rather than economic efficiency. In fact, the authorities 
recognised ex ante that the voucher scheme would produce an economically inefficient ownership structure 
- a pattern of dispersed ownership in which enterprises were substantially controlled by insiders (mainly 
managers) with little interest in restructuring. However, they believed that rapid privatisation would make 
portfolio investment and acquisitions possible. A secondary market in corporate control would quickly 
transform the initial post-privatisation ownership pattern into a more efficient one, in which control passed 
to effective owners with both the means and the inclination to restructure. However, the transition from 
stage one to stage two of this process proved to be extremely difficult, not least because Russia lacked the 
sort of institutions that might resolve, or at least ameliorate, the corporate governance problems posed by 
the initial pattern of insider control. Russia’s bankruptcy laws were extremely weak and the protection of 
creditors’ and shareholders’ rights very poor. In this respect, Russia’s experience was typical of economies 
that opted for rapid mass privatisation programmes. 
In the absence of hard budget constraints, effective competition and functioning capital markets, 
insider managers were able to entrench themselves and to resist both restructuring and liquidation. 
Operating in an environment of extreme political and economic uncertainty and aware of the limitations of 
their own newly acquired property rights, large numbers of managers opted for asset-stripping and capital 
flight over investment and restructuring – a rational, if unattractive, strategy in the circumstances. Given 
the absence of any effective control of management by shareholders and an almost total lack of protection 
of minority shareholders, managers often found it easy use their positions to expropriate the assets of other 
stakeholders. Moreover, dispersed ownership often gave rise to conflicts – many of them violent – among 
shareholders seeking effective control. Unsurprisingly, restructuring did not become much of a priority as 
long as asset-control contests were under way. Given the weak protection of property rights, control 
contests were often zero-sum: those who prevailed and secured controlling stakes were often able to 
exploit, if not drive out, minority shareholders. 
The loans-for-shares deals have, if anything, generated even more criticism than the voucher scheme. 
Loans-for-shares substantially undermined the legitimacy of private ownership of large industrial assets. 
They also weakened the popular support for the protection of property rights, and they have therefore been 
haunting Russian big business ever since. That said, most of the enterprises involved were in very bad 
shape by the mid-1990s.49 Their main assets were legal claims to valuable reserves of natural resources, 
although these claims were often legally ill defined. The low prices involved thus to some degree reflected 
real political and commercial risks, as well as the determination of those involved to exclude outsiders. In 
this connection it should be noted that, for all the attention focused on them, the loans-for-shares deals 
were unique only in their transparency: both the auction processes and the sums involved were widely 
publicised. However, there is no reason to believe that the insiders who secured stakes in extremely 
valuable companies outside the collateral auctions actually paid any more than the loans-for-shares 
tycoons. In reality, the loans-for-shares deals are perhaps better understood as a further stage in the insider 
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privatisation that began in the late Soviet period and continued during the voucher phase of 1992–94. In 
every loans-for-shares auction but one, the lenders involved already had a significant degree of control 
over the companies they acquired.50 In short, insider privatisations tended to predominate in Russia no 
matter what mechanisms were used, and where asset privatisation did not take place, enterprise insiders 
often ‘privatised’ financial flows, siphoning funds and assets from state enterprises into vehicles they 
controlled. 
The give-away nature of the voucher scheme and the low valuations used in most subsequent sales 
mean that privatisation proceeds have been very modest compared to the value of the assets realised, even 
when the value of those assets is discounted to reflect the undoubted political risks involved and the 
enormous difficulties of securing effective control over a Russian enterprise even after purchasing it. In 
1997 (until 2004, the peak year for privatisation revenues), income from the sale of state property totalled 
0.9 per cent of GDP. In most years during 1992–99, privatisation income was around 0.1 per cent. The sale 
of state property generated no more than about 1 per cent of the revenues of the consolidated state budget 
in the 1990s.51 The fiscal benefits of privatisation on the expenditure side are more difficult to assess. One 
of the major aims of privatisation was to separate non-viable enterprises from the budget, but privatisation 
failed to prevent government bodies at all levels from extending a range of implicit and sometimes explicit 
subsidies to distressed enterprises.52 That said, the experience of other transition economies, where 
privatisation was much slower, suggests that these subsidies would probably have been greater still had the 
recipients remained in the state sector.53  
The fiscal benefits of privatisation have thus been modest, especially when compared with the value 
of the assets involved. While this cannot be regarded as good news, it is hardly surprising. Russian 
privatisation has not (with a few exceptions) been oriented primarily towards fiscal ends. Moreover, the 
insider-oriented nature of the process means that it has largely involved the transfer of assets to those 
enjoying de facto informal rights over them prior to privatisation (i.e. to insiders) at very low prices. As 
Alexeev (1999) observes, this suggests that privatisation served largely to formalise, and perhaps to 
magnify to some degree, pre-reform control over assets.54 
Nevertheless, the evidence suggests that privatisation has improved enterprise performance 
In assessing the contribution of privatisation to overall economic performance, it is crucial to 
distinguish between the process by which state assets were transferred into private ownership and the 
impact of that transfer on the privatised enterprises. While the defects of Russia’s privatisation process 
cannot be denied, they should not obscure the fact that the evidence strongly supports the proposition that 
privatisation has improved enterprise performance. Indeed, for all the opprobrium heaped on Russian 
privatisation policies, it is difficult to find any serious empirical study that does not show positive effects 
of privatisation on restructuring.55 This holds true even for enterprises privatised to insiders during the 
                                                     
50. The exception was Norilsk Nickel. Oneksimbank, which bought the Norilsk stake, met fierce resistance 
within the company and had to fight a protracted battle to assert its rights as owner. 
51. The exception here, too, was 1997, when a catastrophic shortfall in tax revenues was partially offset by a 
handful of large privatisation sales, amounting to 3.3 per cent of gross revenues. 
52. Unpenalised tax arrears and arrears on gas/electricity bills were among the most common forms of implicit 
subsidy. 
53. On Romania, in particular, see Ahrend and Oliveira Martins (2003).  
54. Indeed, in some cases, these rights already existed de jure (e.g. occupiers of flats who were able to 
privatise them for nominal sums). 
55. See Tompson (2002) for an overview of around 50 empirical studies of various aspects of Russian 
privatisation. 
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voucher phase, and for companies involved in the loans-for-shares schemes, as well as for companies sold 
off in other ways. While studies vary widely in their assessments of the extent and speed of change, 
virtually all of them evidence of improved performance after privatisation. In particular, they find higher 
average productivity and faster productivity growth in privatised enterprises, as well as faster sales growth. 
Privatised firms tend to shed excess labour more rapidly than state-owned firms and are far more likely to 
change product lines, invest in new equipment and adopt forms of remuneration linked to productivity. 
These findings suggest that Russia’s experience is typical of transition economies generally.56 Critically, 
the positive effect of privatisation is stronger in economic magnitude and statistical significance as the time 
elapsed since privatisation increases. Enterprises privatised for less than two years differ little from state-
owned enterprises in their performance. In contrast, enterprises privatised for three years or more 
significantly outperform state-owned enterprises. 
Nevertheless, the empirical work done on Russian enterprises confirms that the method of 
privatisation can make a difference. For example, a good deal of research suggests that the beneficial 
effects of privatisation were most pronounced where a strong outside owner had emerged. However, the 
extent of the problems arising from insider control should not be exaggerated. First, performance 
improvements were observed even where insiders retained control of companies after privatisation. 
Secondly, despite the under-developed nature of Russian capital markets and the absence of a real market 
in corporate control, there were substantial post-voucher changes in the structure of ownership, generally 
in the direction of more concentrated (and thus, in the Russian context, more effective) ownership. Thirdly, 
the problem was not that insider ownership was necessarily a bad thing but rather that, in Russian 
conditions, insider control made real market-oriented restructuring less likely. Managers often found it 
more lucrative to concentrate on informal profit-seeking (i.e. asset stripping and other forms of theft) while 
workers’ chief concern was job preservation. In theory, of course, market disciplines should have 
compelled insiders in failing enterprises either to restructure or to surrender control to those who could and 
would do so. As those disciplines have become more effective – in other words, as the authorities have 
become less willing to prop up failing firms – the problem has become far less acute. 
A further point to be made in respect of privatisation’s contribution to growth is simply that the 
Russian state has proved to be an extremely inefficient owner of those assets that it continues to hold as 
state property. The track records of most large, state-owned companies in Russia would appear to be strong 
prima facie arguments in favour of privatisation. As a rule, output and productivity have tended to grow 
much faster in sectors that are relatively free of state ownership and interference.57 Moreover, in sectors 
such as oil, where there have been private and state-controlled companies operating side by side, private 
companies have generally been much more efficient.58 
The foregoing should not be taken to imply that Russian privatisation achieved all that it might have 
done. Many criticisms of the process are clearly valid, not least those which focus on the way in which the 
chaotic and often corrupt privatisation processes of the 1990s have made it difficult to secure and 
legitimate the post-privatisation property settlement.59 There is little doubt that the continuing insecurity of 
property rights in Russia today is partly the result of past privatisation processes, and that this has hurt 
                                                     
56. See, e.g., Claessens and Djankov, 2002. 
57. Ahrend (2004b).  
58. See OECD (2004a:125–7).  
59. This is a political problem as well as a legal one, since polls consistently confirm the Russian public’s view 
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economic performance. There is also good reason to believe that renewed insecurity about property rights 
contributed significantly to the slowdown in fixed investment and in the growth of a number of key 
industrial sectors, including oil, during 2004.60 
Financial sector development has so far produced only limited benefits to the economy as a whole 
The banking sector and financial markets are both rather small relative to GDP and their role in 
financing productive investment is still limited.61 The insurance sector is even more under-developed. 
While all three sectors are now growing rapidly, further reform will be essential if they are to develop over 
the long term and to perform the functions normally expected of them in a market economy. This is an 
important reform priority, as a growing body of research has substantially strengthened the case for a 
‘positive, first-order relationship between financial development and economic growth’62 in both 
developing and developed economies. Moreover, analyses of post-communist states, in particular, suggest 
that more efficient financial intermediation does indeed contribute to economic growth.63 The evidence 
also lends credence to the view that the intermediation-growth link is stronger for less financially 
developed countries, such as Russia. There are thus good reasons to believe that the development of the 
financial system in general, and the banking system in particular, will be critical to sustaining strong 
growth of investment and output in Russia over the longer term.  
Fifteen years after the emergence of the first commercial banks in Russia, the Russian banking sector 
remains small, fragmented and dominated by a few state-owned institutions. While formal barriers to 
foreign banks’ entry have been relaxed, the foreign presence in the sector is still limited. Despite very rapid 
growth after the 1998 financial crisis, banking sector assets amounted to just over 42 per cent of GDP in 
2003, well below the levels of the more advanced transition economies of Central Europe and a small 
fraction of the levels typical of EU member states (Table 2). The deposit base, though growing rapidly, is 
still relatively small, and credits to non-financial enterprises and organisations in 2003 had reached just 
about 17.3 per cent of GDP. Bank credits financed only about 4.8 per cent of fixed investment in 2003. 
Ownership structures tend to be opaque and there is little trust among banks, or between banks and clients 
with whom they have no ownership or other ties. The sector thus remains highly segmented. The inter-
bank market is under-developed, and there is little of the interaction among banks typically found in a well 
functioning network of financial intermediaries. There is little pooling, trading or sharing of risk.64 Thus, 
bank portfolios tend to be highly concentrated on both the asset and liability sides, and a large share of 
lending is still to related parties.  
                                                     
60. For details, see Ahrend and Tompson (2004b).  
61. See OECD (2004a), chapter 5, for details. 
62. Levine (1997:688). See, in addition to Levine (1997), King and Levine (1993); and Levine and Zervos 
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63. Koivu (2002). 
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 ECO/WKP(2005)17 
 35 
 
Table 2. Banking sector development in selected economies 
2002 
 Russia Hungary Poland Czech EU 
Per capita GDP (USD) 3100 5150 4600 5500 26000 
No. of banks 1329 64 64 37 7219 
Per cent of foreign capital 5 66 69 94 n.a. 
Assets, per cent of GDP 38 72 67 121 280 
Credits, per cent of GDP 20 32 26 36 118 
Capital, per cent of GDP 5 8 8 7 120 
Deposits per capita (USD) 350 2700 2400 4850 17500 
Source: CBR, World Bank, BIS statistics. 
Russian financial markets are in a similar situation. After more than a decade of development, they 
have begun to acquire the technical and functional characteristics of mature markets. However, though 
growing rapidly, they are small and generally illiquid. While total stock market capitalisation in early 2004 
was relatively high for an emerging market, at around USD 200bn (almost 50 per cent of GDP), indicators 
of liquidity and depth were still poor. The shares of only about 7–10 companies (mainly in oil and gas) 
accounted for around 90 per cent of turnover on the two major stock exchanges. The corporate bond 
market more than doubled in size in 2003, but the volume of placements amounted to only about 1 per cent 
of GDP. Activity is somewhat more diversified than on the stock market: the oil and gas sector accounts 
for only about 40 per cent of outstanding issues. Somewhat larger than the corporate bond market is the 
market in unsecured promissory notes (vekselya), where about USD10bn was outstanding at the end of 
2003. Though vekselya are popular as a liquidity management instrument, they are a riskier investment 
than corporate bonds, as their issuing requirements are less demanding and their legal status is less well 
defined.65 Domestic financial markets thus remain a very limited source of investment capital. Even the 
government debt market is under-developed: the total volume of rouble-denominated government debt 
outstanding at end-2003 was equal to roughly 5 per cent of GDP, but only about 40 per cent of this was 
tradable – and a very large share of that was held by state-owned banks anyway. This is a problem, as the 
absence of a liquid, well functioning market in government debt deprives the CBR of a potentially 
important instrument with which to manage the money supply and sterilise foreign exchange inflows. It 
also limits commercial banks’ opportunities for managing their liquidity and impedes the development of a 
proper market for interest-rate formation.66  
The insurance industry is even less developed than the banks and capital markets. Over 2,000 
insurances companies were created in the 1990s, but the vast majority were under-capitalised entities 
created to meet the needs of their owners. Estimates of the prevalence of such ‘pocket’ or ‘captive’ 
insurances vary widely, but there is no doubt that they still constitute most of the sector. One recent 
Russian study estimates that only about 10 per cent of premium income in 2002 was paid at arm’s length 
- that is, paid by customers to insurers with which they were not linked by shareholdings or similar ties. 
Companies which insure themselves are not so much securing insurance cover as using insurance to write 
off expenses and avoid taxes. This is particularly true with respect to life insurance. In 2002, it was 
estimated that over 80 per cent of Russia’s life insurance business consisted of tax-free salary enhancement 
schemes. No one really knows what proportion of the non-life sector’s business consists of such ‘grey 
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schemes’, but a recent Russian analysis concluded that just 36 per cent of premium income in 2003 
consisted of real insurance.67 Tax changes adopted in recent years have greatly reduced the scope for 
employing such schemes, but they have hardly been eliminated: the Federal Insurance Inspectorate 
estimates that ‘grey schemes’ accounted for more than 40 per cent of premium income in 2003. Some 
Russian insurance companies estimate that the true figure is closer to 65 per cent.  
Given the limits on Russia’s current ability to attract foreign investment and on the capacity of firms 
outside the resource sectors to finance investment from retained earnings, Russian growth will depend to a 
great extent on the effective mobilisation and intermediation of domestic savings.68 Moreover, a more 
efficient financial system could also play a role in fostering the diversification of economic activity in 
Russia. At present, the lack of mechanisms for efficiently allocating investment resources across economic 
sectors is a major problem. Indeed, the financial system in its current state arguably reinforces Russia’s 
existing economic structure rather than facilitating change. In light of these considerations, the limited 
economic benefits of financial sector reform to date must be regarded as one of the disappointments of the 
Russian transition. 
Russia’s experience shows both the benefits of competition and the need for stronger competition policy  
The performance of various Russian industrial and service sectors since 1992 has underscored the 
benefits of competition for economic performance, particularly in conjunction with privatisation. As noted 
above, a good deal of research on privatisation emphasises its interaction with such factors as competition 
and market structures. Other work suggests that privatisation had a greater impact on firm performance in 
markets that were competitive and were dominated by privatised enterprises than it did where the 
privatised concern faced competition chiefly from state-owned enterprises – a reflection, in many cases of 
the distortions that can occur if state-owned producers enjoy privileged positions in markets.69 The impact 
of powerful incumbents on entry may go some way to explaining why so many of the most dynamic 
sectors in Russia are relatively new activities (e.g. mobile telephony), where competition among providers 
has developed in the absence of an already existing dominant firm or group of firms. Overall, productivity 
performance has generally been better in sectors characterised by robust competition and it has been 
notably poor in sectors still dominated by state-owned companies enjoying substantial monopoly power.70 
This underscores the importance of policies and institutions designed not only to safeguard but to promote 
competition. 
Russia created its first competition authority early in the transition period and has since developed a 
substantial body of competition law. Both the Constitution and the Civil Code express strong support for 
competition as well. Given the centrality of robust competition to the creation and operation of efficient 
markets, this is hardly surprising. However, competition policy has often been less of a priority in practice 
than it has on paper. Successive Russian competition authorities (the name and status of which have 
changed frequently) have tended to be over-stretched, under-empowered and under-resourced. Instead of 
focusing narrowly on protecting and promoting competition, the competition authority was assigned 
numerous additional duties. However, it was not generally provided with staffing and resources to cope 
with its large – and frequently changing – range of duties, and it was endowed with relatively weak 
investigative and enforcement powers as regards its core competition role. In the spring of 2004, the 
Ministry for Anti-Monopoly Policy was liquidated in conjunction with the broader reorganisation of the 
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federal executive and replaced by a new Federal Anti-Monopoly Service. The service’s mandate is actually 
somewhat more focused than the ministry’s was, since consumer protection and utilities issues have been 
shifted away from it. While it is too early to assess the impact of this change, the narrowing of the service’s 
mandate is probably a step forward for competition policy. 
Judicial reforms have ended some abusive legal practices but the administration of law remains uneven  
An extensive package of judicial reform legislation was adopted beginning in late 2001.71 This 
included, among other measures, a new code of civil procedure, as well as a new procedural code for the 
arbitration courts, part 3 of the Civil Code, and new laws on the status of judges and on the constitutional 
court. The adoption of these statutes, which faced considerable opposition from an array of vested 
interests, represents a significant achievement. Of particular importance was the clarification of the 
respective jurisdictions of the arbitration courts and the general civil courts. Their jurisdictions used to 
overlap. Disputes could and did run in parallel in both systems, often with one side winning in the 
arbitration court and the other in the court of general jurisdiction. This often reflected non-legal factors 
(each side would sue in a court over which it expected to enjoy some influence) but it also reflected 
differences in the law the two types of court applied. In the absence of a single supreme authority, there 
was no way to determine which judgement took precedence.72 A further important step was the reduction 
in the supervisory role of the procuracy, which previously had considerable power to challenge court 
rulings with which they disagreed on the grounds that the rulings were contrary to the public interest. This 
was true even of cases in which the state was not involved. As a result of prosecutorial interventions (often 
initiated on the basis of political or other considerations), victors in civil cases often found their awards 
overturned and their cases returned to the court of first instance for re-trial. The passage of new legislation 
cannot of itself ensure that the law is fairly and consistently applied – a challenge that largely remains to be 
overcome. However, the new measures did put an end to a number of abusive legal practices that had 
arisen in the 1990s as a result of gaps in the law and contradictions between different pieces of legislation.  
The law on technical regulation is potentially a major step forward for regulatory governance 
A major weakness of Russian economic policy since 1991 has been the relative neglect of regulatory 
governance policy, in the sense of developing the capacity to initiate and enforce cost-effective, ‘fit-for-
purpose’ regulations and regulatory regimes. This has begun to change, not least as a result of the adoption 
in December 2002 of a new law on technical regulation.73 The law set in motion a major review of around 
60,000 norms and regulations concerning the certification of products on environmental, health, safety and 
other grounds. Many previously mandatory norms will become voluntary, while others will be scrapped 
altogether. Moreover, the law outlines new procedures for proposing, evaluating and adopting new 
standards and regulations. If implemented in full, these procedures will make the regulatory process more 
predictable, transparent and inclusive, facilitating widespread consultation and full assessment of the 
potential economic impact of new regulations. The procedural provisions of the law also emphasise the 
need to avoid discriminatory or unnecessarily restrictive measures, to apply internationally recognised 
standards where possible and to recognise the equivalence of other countries’ regulatory measures. The 
procedural aspect of the reform represents a major breakthrough for Russia, and it is to be hoped that this 
focus on reform of the regulatory process (as opposed to the substance of regulation) will be replicated in 
other spheres. If implemented fully and consistently, the reform of technical regulation should result in a 
                                                     
71. For more detail on the judicial reform package, see Tompson (2001). For the texts of the procedural codes, 
see GPK (2002); APK (2002). 
72. Courts of general jurisdiction are subordinate to the Supreme Court but the arbitration courts are under 
their own Supreme Arbitration Court, over which the Supreme Court has no authority. 
73. See OECD (2204a:89) for details of the law. 
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major reduction of the regulatory burden on business, particularly in manufacturing sectors. Given the 
importance of technical regulation as a barrier to market entry and product development, the reform will 
also reduce a major constraint on innovation and the introduction of new products. It may therefore serve, 
at least at the margins, to facilitate the diversification of economic activity. Nevertheless, much remains to 
be done – the implementation period set out in the law is no less than seven years, and Russia is still a 
relative newcomer to the idea of a formalised and central regulatory governance policy. 
‘De-bureaucratisation’ legislation has helped to reduce the bureaucratic burden on private firms 
In an effort to reduce bureaucratic rent-seeking and to create a more favourable climate for small and 
medium businesses, the government in 2001–02 secured the adoption of a trio of laws that reduced the 
range of activities subject to licensing requirements, streamlined procedures for registering new businesses 
and reduced officials’ power to conduct arbitrary inspections of enterprises by the police, fire, sanitation, 
tax and other authorities (often an occasion for the extraction of bribes).74 Another law, further simplifying 
registration procedures, was adopted in October 2003. These measures have had a positive impact, but 
survey data suggest that implementation has been uneven. Small-business surveys conducted under the 
auspices of the World Bank and the Centre for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR) show that 
matters improved with respect to all three problems after the laws were adopted, but the picture varies from 
region to region and it is clear that many officials do not adhere to the new legislation. It also appears that 
progress slowed significantly in 2003: 
• Licensing requirements (both formal and informal) have been substantially reduced, but they 
remain more widespread than the law allows, and the time and cost involved in obtaining them 
rose substantially in 2003. The average cost of a licence issued more than quadrupled between 
early 2002 and late 2003, while the time involved increased by 14 days on average.75 
• The number of inspections, both planned and unplanned, fell steadily during 2001–03, but they 
were still in many cases far more frequent than permitted under the new legislation. Moreover, 
around half of unplanned inspections were conducted without a warrant, and multiple inspections 
remained common. A second inspection by a state body increased the probability of still further 
inspections by anywhere from six to fifty times, depending on the agency involved. The survey 
data show no evidence of a reduction in the amount of bribery, and, indeed, financial losses from 
inspections rose in 2003, after falling in 2001–02. Around 62 per cent of payments to police 
following inspections were described as ‘unofficial’.  
• Registration appears to be the area of greatest improvement. The CEFIR survey data show that 
registration became significantly simpler and faster during 2001–03, while reliance on 
professional intermediaries, acquaintances and bribes in the registration process declined 
markedly.  
The importance of such measures is all the greater in view of the increasing evidence of dynamism in 
Russia’s small business sector. While the official data on small business are problematic, the evidence 
suggests that this sector has also developing relatively rapidly in recent years, albeit from a very low base. 
This holds true even when adjusting for the unusually large role played by unincorporated entrepreneurs 
                                                     
74. For details, see OECD (2002:80–104). 
75. It should be acknowledged that this is partly a result of the reduction in the number of licensed activities. 
However, this reduction should be reflected primarily in the changes between round 2 and round 3 of the 
CEFIR surveys. Yet there were large increases in time and money spent between rounds 3 and 4 as well.   
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(the so-called PBOYuL)76 in the small business sector.77 This is important because PBOYuL do not 
currently appear in official statistics covering the small enterprises’ (SE) sector. The number of people 
working in the SE and PBOYuL sectors is roughly of the same order of magnitude, and together they 
account for somewhat above 20 per cent of the work-force. While the small business sector is thus larger 
than usually claimed, it is still relatively small by the standards of OECD countries or the more advanced 
transition economies. In the OECD area, it is not unusual for more than half of the labour force to works in 
SMEs. The available data suggest that the combined SE/PBOYuL sector has been growing at around 
15-20 per cent per year since 2001, with growth accelerating to around 30 per cent in 2003.78 The 
acceleration in 2003 was mainly driven by the ongoing consumption boom, as witnessed by particularly 
strong increases in the retail sector and transport. Creating conditions that favour the emergence and 
development of more small businesses – especially in sectors where they remain few and far between, such 
as manufacturing – provides an important way not only to help sustain economic growth but also to foster 
the diversification of economic activity. 
III. Structural reform: the challenges ahead 
In assessing the most important structural reform challenges facing Russia, it is important to bear in 
mind not only the achievements just described but also the lessons for future reform suggested by Russia’s 
recent history. First, it is important to note the extent to which the impact of the reforms discussed above 
did or did not reinforce one another. Thus, it is clear that the benefits of privatisation and competition 
appear to have been greatest in those sectors where both were present. Similarly, limited progress with 
respect to issues like the rule of law and corporate governance tended to reduce the beneficial effects of 
privatisation and undermined the development of the financial system. This suggests that 
complementarities among different strands of reform are more than just a theoretical issue. Secondly, it is 
clear from the foregoing that the basic institutional framework of Russia’s new economy is still very much 
a work in progress. Much more remains to be done to strengthen property rights, establish the rule of law 
and foster competition in product markets. While the Russian authorities have embarked on some 
impressive – and often technically complex – ‘second-generation’ reforms in fields such as electricity 
restructuring, many ‘first-generation’ reforms, concerned with creating the basic institutions of a market 
economy, have yet to be completed. Perhaps the most fundamental first-generation task is the creation of a 
legal system on which economic agents can rely for timely, effective enforcement of contracts and 
protection of property rights. 
In general, the most difficult reform challenges have been those concerned with changing, rather than 
merely reducing, the state’s role in the economy. Thus, measures that require the state to refrain from 
regulation have generally been relatively easy to implement, once adopted. In particular, the most 
important liberalising measures of the transition – price and trade liberalisation – were implemented 
relatively quickly in the early 1990s, albeit with some significant exceptions. It has proved far more 
difficult to implement reforms that entail the creation of new institutions and new, market-oriented forms 
of regulation, such as competition policy or the reform of its infrastructure monopolies. Increasingly, these 
are the challenges that dominate Russia’s reform agenda.  
                                                     
76. PBOYuL is the Russian acronym for predprinimatel’ bez obrazovania iuridicheskogo litsa (‘entrepreneurs 
without the formation of a legal person’). 
77. A great deal of activity that in other countries would be carried out by small companies is in fact done by 
PBOYuL in Russia. 
78. It should be borne in mind that, owing to the limitations of the available data, these estimates are 
necessarily very rough. 
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Improving the quality of state institutions is the key priority 
By the end of the 1990s, both the Russian authorities and many outside observers had come to regard 
the reform of state institutions themselves as the most important reform challenge facing Russia. If 
privatisation, the elimination of subsidies and macroeconomic stabilisation dominated the reform agenda in 
the early years of the market transformation, attention has in recent years been focused on reforming the 
courts, the civil service79 and the major regulatory institutions, as well as recasting relations between the 
federal centre and sub-national governments. However, progress in rebuilding state capacities has been 
very uneven. Since 1998, there has been a dramatic strengthening of the state’s extractive capacities – its 
ability to tax – and of its rule-making capacity. The latter largely reflects increasing executive dominance 
of the legislature. However, the same cannot be said of rule enforcement. Doubts about the independence, 
competence and probity of the courts, the prosecutors and the police persist. Moreover, there remain good 
reasons to question the ‘relative autonomy’ of the state: state bodies are sometimes penetrated by, or even 
captive to, particular private interests – if not simply those of the officials who control them. These 
weaknesses undermine both rule enforcement and the Russian state’s still limited administrative capacities. 
The state bureaucracy is large, often unresponsive to either the public or its political masters, and riddled 
with corruption.  
These weaknesses impinge directly on the state’s ability to devise, adopt and implement policies that 
make significant demands on the probity or administrative capacities of the state. This point is of particular 
relevance when considering the current debates over ‘industrial policy’ and economic ‘diversification’. 
Whatever the merits of the various proposals for more a more activist industrial policy – and some of them 
are far more market-friendly than others80 – there remain good reasons to be sceptical of the bureaucracy’s 
ability to implement them. At present, the Russian state performs its most fundamental domestic tasks, 
from law enforcement to social service provision, relatively poorly. In the absence of a major improvement 
in its ability to fulfil these essential functions, it is unlikely to be very successful in tackling more 
technically demanding policy challenges. Building an honest, effective state administration is arguably, 
therefore, the most important structural reform priority.  
It is critical to recognise that successful reform will involve more than simply the recovery of 
capacities eroded or lost in the 1990s. Russia does not merely need a strong state; it needs a state different 
in kind to that which it inherited from the Soviet Union. Soviet administrative bureaucracies were chiefly 
concerned with directing economic activities, assigning economic tasks to agents and rewarding (or 
punishing) them for fulfilment (or non-fulfilment) of those tasks. The role of the state in a market 
economy, by contrast, is overwhelmingly regulatory. In most cases, the state’s function is not to tell 
economic agents what ends to pursue but to act as an impartial referee and a provider of public goods in a 
marketplace full of autonomous actors choosing and pursuing their own ends. Unfortunately, the task-
fulfilling mindset of the Soviet bureaucracy is often reflected in the behaviour of its Russian successor. 
Even after more than a decade of reforms, the state is still prone to rely too much on direct control over 
assets and intervention in markets; one of the chief aims of reform is to move towards greater reliance on 
law and regulation instead. Redefining the role of the state thus constitutes an important challenge.  
The reform of state institutions in Russia involves a number of distinct strands. First, the general 
rubric of ‘administrative reform’ encompasses both the reorganisation of federal executive bodies 
undertaken in early 2004 and civil service reform. Secondly, as noted above, major reform of the judiciary 
                                                     
79. We use the conventional English term ‘civil service’ to refer to the permanent bureaucracy. The Russian 
term, ‘gosudarstvennaya sluzhba’ is more accurately translated as ‘state service’. As will be argued below, 
this is not a purely linguistic point, as the difference in emphasis is reflected in the culture of the service. 
80.  See, e.g. Drebentsov (2004).  
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was undertaken in 2001.81 The 2001 package marked a major step forward, but much remains to be done to 
rid the courts of corruption and political influence. Thirdly, there is the on-going redefinition of the 
relationships among national, regional and local governments. Finally, there is still considerable work 
ahead in building capacities essential to good policy-making, such as improving the transparency and 
regularity of the policy process, and building more effective regulatory agencies. The discussion which 
follows does not attempt to address in detail all of these areas; rather, it aims to outline the nature of the 
challenges involved and the choices Russian policy-makers face in deciding how to deal with them, 
particularly in respect to the central issue of how to refashion the state bureaucracy. 
The reform of federal executive bodies got off to a rocky start 
A much anticipated reorganisation of federal executive bodies was undertaken in March 2004, after 
several years of debate. In an effort to streamline the government structure, it reorganised the federal 
executive into three types of institution, assigning a specific role to each: 
• Federal Ministries are meant to be policy-making bodies. They engage in policy analysis, 
development and evaluation in their respective domains and are responsible for drafting new 
legislation. They coordinate and monitor the activities of federal services and agencies operating 
within their jurisdictions. The reform reduced the number of ministries from 23 to 15, in an 
attempt to streamline government decision-making. 
• Federal Services are supervisory and regulatory bodies. Funded from the state budget, they can 
issue individual regulations but not normative legal acts.  
• Federal Agencies are direct providers of public services to the state and/or private sectors. Their 
funding can therefore come in part from charges and fees paid by their ‘customers’.  
On the face of it, the reorganisation appears to reflect a desire to separate policy-making, service 
provision and regulatory functions, which could in principle increase the efficiency of executive bodies 
while reducing the conflicts of interest that arise when these functions are combined. Unfortunately, there 
is as yet little evidence that the reorganisation has achieved either of these aims. First, it disrupted the work 
of many government bodies for much of 2004, as officials were preoccupied with organising the new 
structures and sorting out their respective roles. Secondly, the regulators continue in some cases to be 
subordinate to the ministries they regulate. There is still little indication that the Russian authorities are 
committed to creating regulatory organs that are genuinely independent and properly shielded from outside 
pressure, whether public or private. The subordination of the new Federal Anti-monopoly Service to the 
cabinet is a particularly striking instance, since the Service is required to evaluate many of the 
government’s own acts. 
Civil service reform is likely to prove an even greater challenge 
The challenge posed by civil service reform in Russia is enormous. The administrative systems 
inherited from the Soviet regime were in many ways the exact opposite of the ideal of a public bureaucracy 
as it is understood in most OECD countries.82 The Western model, as reflected in the writings of Max 
Weber, emphasises a strict functional/hierarchical division of labour; the existence of career civil servants 
as a distinct group, formed on the basis of competitive recruitment and merit-based promotion; and a 
distinctive rationality based on legality, impartiality, objectivity and regularity; and a public-service ethos. 
A combination of relatively good salaries and security of tenure, as well as the presence of a relatively 
                                                     
81. For details, see OECD (2004a:88–9) and Tompson (2001). 
82. See Goetz (2001:1033). 
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clear career path, makes returns to investment in skills and tenure good enough to retain able 
administrators.  
The Soviet administrative hierarchy, by contrast, rejected both the separation of political and 
administrative spheres and the autonomy of the administrative bureaucracy. The state administration was 
intertwined with, and penetrated by, the ruling party at every level. Recruitment was politicised in principle 
(resting on the party-administered ‘nomenklatura’ system)83 and often personalised in practice. The rule-
oriented rationality of the Weberian model was rejected in favour of an overriding emphasis on the 
implementation of party decisions, which took precedence over legal norms. In the Soviet period, rule 
violations were often tacitly condoned in the interests of task fulfilment. Thus, Gosarbitrazh, the state body 
charged with resolving inter-enterprise disputes – and the body from which today’s arbitration courts are 
descended – was expected to resolve disputes according to the law, subject to the requirements of plan 
fulfilment. If the law came into conflict with the need to fulfil plan tasks, it was the latter which tended to 
take precedence. Far from being characterised by a clear functional division of labour, the Soviet system 
was characterised by complex and often overlapping jurisdictions and lines of authority, which were 
intended to facilitate monitoring and control of officials by the political leadership. These are all enduring 
features of Soviet administrative practice: in most respects, the Russian bureaucracy today resembles its 
Soviet predecessor far more than any Weberian model. 
The highly personalised nature of the administrative system inherited from the Soviet state merits 
particular attention. The Soviet administrative hierarchy, despite its complex and seemingly well defined 
formal institutions, relied heavily on an informal structure of personal networks within the party-state 
apparatus to function. Authority was often vested more in persons than in offices. Patron-client ties and the 
distribution of rewards generally mattered more than the application and enforcement of rules and 
formalised codes of behaviour. Such personalistic administrative structures tend to weaken state capacities 
by encouraging rent-seeking and corruption, and by raising the costs of monitoring and enforcement. 
Russia’s early post-Soviet governments made little headway in addressing this problem. Indeed, such 
personalistic patterns of authority tend to be replicated by the still common practice whereby senior 
officials and politicians seek to bolster their authority over the institutions they run by securing the 
appointment of trusted personal associates to key posts.84 The implications of this situation for the design 
of any civil service reform are explored below. 
The personalism which pervades the bureaucracy lies at the heart of one of the paradoxes of post-
Soviet Russia: it has a weak state but strong officials. The patronage dispensed by individual officials 
- particularly those charged with managing state property or large financial flows – can be enormous, while 
the weakness of the administrative machinery often makes it easy for individual officials to use this power 
to pursue narrow private or political ends. The Russian state could also be called a weak state with strong 
components. A number of specific institutions rate highly on criteria of cohesiveness and effectiveness.85 
Yet in the absence of a strong co-ordinating centre, these institutions often pursue narrow institutional 
interests, working at cross-purposes with each other and with the government itself. This lack of 
cooperation has indeed been one of the main brakes on administrative reform. It is also the major reason 
                                                     
83. See Voslensky (1984).  
84. It is no accident that post-Soviet Russia has seen continuity with respect to such practices: highly 
personalised administrative systems often emerge in periods of political instability, because they enable 
political elites to shore up their political positions and enhance the administrative capabilities of new states 
relatively rapidly. The problem is that they also tend to limit the development of those capabilities beyond 
a certain point. 
85. The central bank, the privatisation agencies and some regional governments all fall into this category. 
However, the close ties of some of these bodies to specific private sector interests has sometimes raised 
questions about their autonomy. 
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for the current concern with restructuring federal executive bodies in such a way as to facilitate more 
efficient policy-making and better policy implementation. 
The Russian bureaucracy has undergone massive change, but little reform since 1991 
Not all the pathologies that afflict the Russian bureaucracy can be attributed directly to the Soviet 
past: more than a decade of transition has also left its mark. The bureaucracy underwent dramatic changes 
during the 1990s, generally as a result of economic and political developments rather than any reform 
strategy:86  
• The 1990s witnessed a large-scale exodus of personnel from the bureaucracy. Those most likely 
to leave were relatively well qualified mid-career officials, who could command much larger 
salaries in the private sector. Thus, the civil service today is substantially older and less well 
educated than its late Soviet counterpart, and mismatches between skills and duties are 
increasingly common.87 Moreover, there is clear evidence that the lower echelons of the public 
administration are dominated by women and younger workers, while the upper echelons tend to 
be dominated by older men, the bulk of whom began their administrative careers by about 1985. 
Turnover among the former is very high, as the structure of the service gives younger officials 
little incentive to stay, while higher-level officials, many of whom are already pensionable, face 
little competitive pressure from below or outside the service.88 
• There is compelling evidence that the problem of official corruption has grown markedly worse 
since 1991. This reflects a combination of factors, including the breakdown not only of the 
political and bureaucratic controls that existed in the Soviet system, but also of the norms and 
beliefs that (however imperfectly) supported the old order.89 Another critical factor is the very 
low pay received by officials, particularly as many low-paid functionaries find themselves 
disposing of very valuable state assets or managing substantial financial flows. Opportunities for 
personal enrichment grew dramatically in the post-Soviet period, even as officials’ remuneration 
declined. 
• The size of the bureaucracy has grown, but by no means as rapidly as is widely thought. In fact, 
the number of officials employed in public administration grew by just about 13.6 per cent during 
1994–2001, with subnational administrations accounting for most of the increase. The balance of 
this growth occurred among federal employees posted in the regions: the central federal 
administrative apparatus shrank. The public administration actually employs an unusually small 
portion of the labour force when compared with most OECD and transition countries.90 Growth 
has partly resulted from the creation of the new agencies needed to regulate a market economy 
                                                     
86. The discussion in this paragraph draws on the analysis found in Huskey and Obolonsky (2003). 
87. The ‘graying’ of the state bureaucracy is not unique to Russia; the US General Accounting Office reported 
in 2002 that more than 30 per cent of the people working for the FBI, the State Department and the 
Defense Department would be eligible to retire by 2006; Wall Street Journal, 19 September 2002. 
88. Brym and Gimpelson (2004:108–10). 
89. See Huskey and Obolonsky (2003). 
90. See Brym and Gimpelson (2004:92–100) for details. It should be noted that comparisons across time and 
countries are complicated by problems of definition, including the creation of new types of officials and the 
reclassification of others in conjunction with the transition. 
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(the bankruptcy service, the securities regulator, etc), but these bodies are, for the most part, still 
relatively small.91  
Box 4. Civil service reform, 1992–2004 
Civil service reform made little headway in the 1990s. The first steps, taken in 1995, represented a throwback to 
traditional caste or corporatist views of the bureaucracy, focusing on the status of officials, and their privileges, 
perquisites and protections. A much more ambitious set of proposals began to be developed from about mid-1997 
under the Commission on State Construction (later the Commission on Administrative Reform). A draft strategy which 
aimed to turn the ‘state service’ into a ‘public service’ – a transformation that would require a dramatic shift in the 
culture and outlook of Russian officials – included proposals to make the bureaucracy smaller, more transparent and 
less expensive, and envisaged the possibility of contracting out to private firms some functions performed by the state. 
The 1997 draft also called for introducing competitive recruitment – which was required under legislation adopted in 
1995 but never implemented. The draft encountered fierce resistance, however, and there was no further progress 
until the adoption in late 2001 of the Federal Programme for Reforming the State Service of the Russian Federation 
(2003–2005). The 2001 programme was largely based on the ideas contained in the 1997 strategy, and it, too, has met 
stiff opposition. The first legislation adopted pursuant to the programme was the 2003 law ‘On the System of State 
Service of the Russian Federation’. Opposition to the bill from within the administration was clearly reflected in the fact 
that, while the original draft bill comprised 119 articles, the text that reached the statute books was only 19 articles 
long. A much longer law was adopted in 2004, setting out the basic framework for the non-diplomatic civil service. 
The 2003 law is largely confined to enshrining in statute the goals and principles enunciated in the concept rather 
than in stipulating concretely how these are to be achieved. It makes reference to numerous issues to be resolved in 
accordance with other primary and secondary legislation still to be adopted.1 The law defines three types of state 
servant (civil, military and police) and states what other legislation shall form the basis for their activities. It also 
provides for a register of state service posts, sets a mandatory retirement age and stipulates that the rank-structures of 
all three branches of service will be co-ordinated so that transfers among them will be possible.  In this, it resembles 
the pre-revolutionary ‘table of ranks’, which also ensured clear equivalence among military, police, civil service and 
even ecclesiastical ranks. Since it is difficult to imagine senior civil servants being put into high military or police posts, 
this has raised some concern that the new structure will facilitate the colonisation of the upper reaches of the civil 
administration by senior officers of the military, police and security services. The civil service law of 2004 goes further, 
outlining the legal status of civil servants and the procedures for appointing, evaluating and promoting them. 
1.  In this, it resembles its 1995 predecessor, ‘On the bases of state service’, which made reference to 79 other 
pieces of federal or regional legislation that were never subsequently adopted. As a result, the 1995 law remained 
a dead letter. 
 
There is still little clarity concerning the strategic direction of civil service reform 
Although reform of the bureaucracy has been actively discussed for several years, the strategic 
direction of the reform is still far from clear. The 2001 programme enunciates a number of worthy goals, 
including greater openness and accountability, a higher level of professionalism, the eradication of 
corruption and clearer legal definitions of the rights, duties and competences of civil servants. However, 
the concept is remarkably thin on specifics and says little about how these ends are to be achieved. It is 
difficult to see a clear model emerging either in the programme or in the various decrees and statutes 
adopted over the last few years. Many of the proposals seem to reflect the classic Weberian model. The 
2001 programme seems to envisage the civil service as a distinct ‘caste’ made up of individuals spending 
lengthy careers in state service. Promotion will be for the most part within branches of service and based 
largely on seniority. However, both the programme and much of the discussion surrounding it also reflects 
the influence of the so-called ‘new public management’ (NPM) that has been very influential in the West 
- and particularly in the main English-speaking countries – since the early 1980s. Of course, Russia need 
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Soviet era, such as the Ministry of Agriculture. 
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not make a stark choice between ‘pure’ Weberianism (an ideal type that does not exist anywhere in any 
case) and the wholesale adoption of the techniques of NPM. There will doubtless be elements of both in 
any reformed state administration and, indeed, both approaches find some reflection in the changes 
adopted in 2003-04 (see Box 4). However, consideration of the contrast between the two models can 
nevertheless help to illuminate some of the issues to be resolved in reforming the civil service.  
Clearly, a serious attempt to refashion the state administration into something more closely 
resembling a classic Weberian public bureaucracy must address a long and difficult set of challenges. It 
will require a greater differentiation of tasks and personnel between the political executive and the 
administrative bureaucracy, the creation and application of a well designed system of administrative law, 
including effective legal controls over administrators’ actions, and the creation of a professional, non-
partisan civil service, whose political neutrality is protected by appropriate institutional arrangements. 
Nevertheless, it could be argued that the Weberian model represents the logical endpoint towards which 
Russian reformers should direct their efforts. The implicit systems and models adopted in other post-
communist states seeking to overhaul their bureaucracies have also been Weberian. Countries like Poland 
and Hungary have largely steered clear of NPM approaches.92 However, some in Russia fear the 
‘conservative’ potential of the Weberian model. They fear that a model of reform emphasising a relatively 
closed, career civil service, with hierarchical structures and the vertical integration of administrative 
structures, could easily be used to create a Weberian bureaucratic façade, behind which little real change 
might take place. The issue of open recruitment, in particular, is likely to be a critical one. 
NPM-based proposals for administrative reform represent the major alternative to the creation of 
large, vertically integrated public bureaucracies on the Weberian model. The precise definition of NPM is 
even more elusive than that of the Weberian model; NPM is more of an approach than a model as such. 
NPM tends to be associated with competition, performance incentives, recruitment into middle and upper 
grades of the civil service, and more movement into and out of the service. It generally includes an 
emphasis on the centrality of the citizen/consumer to the whole process of public-service provision, as well 
as on the accountability of public-sector bodies (and even individual officials) for the results of their work. 
In this respect, NPM seems particularly relevant to those wishing to reorient officials from notions of ‘state 
service’ towards ‘public service’. In order to enhance the quality of public services and the efficiency with 
which they are delivered, advocates of NPM also tend to favour the separation of policy-making from 
service provision, with the latter taken over by semi-autonomous agencies. Such agencies often operate in 
markets or quasi-markets, competing for resources with other public or private service providers. The 
separation of policy-making from service delivery is meant to free policy-makers from the burdens of 
existing service provision, while creating opportunities to provide performance incentives to actual service 
providers by putting agencies onto a contractual footing. Formally, at least, the March 2004 reorganisation 
of the federal executive reflects just such a desire to separate policy-making from service provision.  
The implementation of NPM-style reforms would be more than a little problematic in the current 
institutional environment. NPM emerged in the West as a set of measures designed to reform traditional 
Weberian bureaucracies in order to make them more flexible and efficient. It thus tends to assume a more 
or less Weberian starting point, including clear lines of authority, a culture of rule-observance, and an 
understanding of officials’ roles and duties in terms of the offices they hold rather than their personal 
connections. Successful NPM-based reforms also require predictable resourcing, credible regulation and 
monitoring of staff (to prevent malfeasance), and a generally sound contracting environment. NPM 
techniques are unlikely to achieve the desired results in an administrative system characterised by patron-
client networks, and by low levels of transparency, accountability and respect for legal norms. Merit pay, 
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incentives and more flexible recruitment could easily degenerate in such an environment into pork-barrel 
politics and patronage, except perhaps in situations where performance was really evident to external 
observers. This last point highlights the extent to which greater transparency will be crucial to any attempt 
to reform Russian public administration – particularly if reform is to change the culture of the bureaucracy.  
Whichever overall orientation is ultimately chosen, the Russian authorities face a number of specific 
choices with respect to civil service reform, including: 
• The degree of unity or diversity to be achieved. Historically, Russian ministries and other 
departments have operated according to rules, organisational cultures and career paths specific to 
each ministry or agency. The question of whether, or to what extent, Russia will maintain this 
tradition of separate arrangements for each major group of officials continues to be contested. 
• The vertical integration of state administrative bodies. This partly concerns relations between 
federal institutions and sub-national authorities: the authorities have only recently begun to 
standardise civil service rules and practices across the three levels of government (federal, 
regional and municipal). A second issue, particularly in fields such as law enforcement, concerns 
officials serving in federal ministries and agencies who nevertheless work in the regions. Such 
‘territorial’ federal officials are often heavily influenced – if not co-opted – by regional 
authorities.   
• Recruitment and promotion. The legislation adopted in 2003–04 establishes a basis for 
competitive recruitment (though it leaves many permissible exceptions to this principle) and 
points to a model based on the recruitment into the initial grades of individuals who will become 
career civil servants. However, there remain issues to address concerning whether and under 
what circumstances individuals might be recruited into the service at higher grades and the 
establishment of promotion procedures that are transparent, efficient and fair. 
• Civil service pay. There has long been wide agreement that raising officials’ pay was a necessary, 
though by no means sufficient, element of any attempt to curb official corruption. Corruption will 
be hard to root out while public officials on very low salaries are called upon to take decisions 
affecting the interests of wealthy and powerful companies. The recent move to reduce the size of 
the federal administrative apparatus while significantly increasing officials’ salaries is therefore 
to be commended. However, there is no consensus about how large the pay differentials within 
the service should be, how and by whom pay scales should be determined, whether or not merit-
based pay or other such incentives should be employed, and whether or not to reduce the share of 
remuneration provided in-kind rather than in cash. 
Changes in the broader institutional environment will be crucial to the success of civil service reform 
It is clear from the above that civil service reform in the narrow sense – reorganising structures or 
redefining roles – is likely to achieve little on its own. It cannot be considered in isolation from the wider 
institutional environment. Indeed, changes in that environment probably matter more than the specific 
model of administrative reform the authorities pursue. Thus, whatever the ultimate shape of Russia’s 
reformed public administration, there are a number of basic issues that will need to be addressed if reform 
is not merely to produce the old pathologies in new configurations. These include: 
• Strengthening the rule of law. In particular, it is necessary to establish better protection of the 
independence of the courts against pressure or interference from state bodies or private parties. A 
truly rule-governed administration cannot function where the rule of law is not upheld. This will 
require, among other things, a greater willingness by state bodies to be bound by the law 
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themselves and to make good on legal undertakings. There have been a number of episodes 
recently in which the state has unilaterally withdrawn from legal agreements or unilaterally 
chosen to prosecute actions it had previously acknowledged – implicitly or explicitly – as legal. 
This creates a kind of uncertainty about state behaviour detrimental to the interests of both 
ordinary citizens and private businesses. 
• Increasing the transparency of state institutions. Real bureaucratic accountability – to ordinary 
citizens or elected politicians – will require greater access to both officials themselves and 
information about what officials are doing. This is likely to be resisted: recent survey work finds 
that civil servants at regional and local levels are generally opposed to greater transparency; there 
is little reason to believe that the views of federal officials are any different.93 Formal 
requirements for openness on the part of state agencies, necessary though they are, will probably 
not be enough to generate real transparency: no less critical will be more effective oversight of 
executive and judicial bodies by the legislature, by organs such as the Accounting Chamber, and 
by the press. A more independent press would also enhance both transparency and accountability. 
• Strengthening civil society institutions. The state administration does not operate in a political or 
sociological vacuum: the extent to which it can be made accountable to the public is partly a 
function of the wider relationship between state and society. Cross-country research shows that 
both the rule of law and the development of civil society are strongly and negatively correlated 
with corruption levels.94 The evidence also suggests that a lack of press freedom causes 
corruption.95 Civil service reform would thus benefit not only from a stronger judicial system, but 
also from steps to foster the development of civil society and press freedom.  
• Reducing opportunities for corruption. The laws and rules that bureaucrats administer can be 
made more corruption-resistant. Rules should be simple, transparent and standardised, with few 
exceptions and as little reliance as possible on bureaucratic discretion. Where discretion is 
required, the criteria that should determine officials’ choices should be explicitly set out and their 
actions in most cases should be subject to some form of outside (administrative or judicial) 
review if need be. Many recent legislative changes seem to be at least partly motivated by this 
kind of reasoning, including changes to fiscal federal relations and measures to curb bureaucratic 
interference in commercial activity by, for example, curtailing officials’ inspection powers, 
simplifying business registration and reducing the range of activities subject to licensing 
requirements. The draft law on the subsoil submitted to the government at the end of 2004 also 
included a number of provisions designed to regularise procedures and reduce the scope for 
arbitrary decision-making or corruption. One of the best reasons for avoiding unnecessary 
regulation is that it tends to create opportunities for corruption, and there is some evidence that 
superfluous regulations are often adopted or maintained for this very reason – officials are 
reluctant to give up the rents involved. 
• Strengthening enforcement. While drafting corruption-resistant legislation is important, it will not 
on its own reduce corruption so long as crimes go unpunished. Those who try unduly to influence 
the decision making of judicial or administrative institutions must be brought to account in a fair, 
transparent process. This will require a good deal of political will, because big offenders are often 
wealthy private citizens or high-ranking officials. Moreover, a consistent approach to 
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enforcement will be needed in order to ensure that anti-corruption cases are not (and are not 
perceived to be) merely political or commercial weapons. 
It is critical to note that such changes in the institutional environment will also help advance reform in 
other areas. In particular, they will facilitate – though not guarantee – improvements in private-sector 
institutions as well as in the state administration. To a significant extent, the opacity of Russian business 
and the complex (and often shady) structures used to exercise ownership and control are defensive. They 
reflect a desire to shield business from possible attacks by state institutions or private-sector rivals. 
Improvements in corporate governance, for example, would be easier to achieve if Russian firms did not 
believe that transparency was likely to render them more vulnerable to bureaucratic predation. Of course, 
there are other motives for opacity, such as tax evasion. Nevertheless, substantial improvements in 
corporate governance and private-sector behaviour are unlikely in the absence of similar improvements in 
the functioning of state institutions: state reform is a necessary, though by no means sufficient, condition 
for ‘civilising’ Russia’s private-sector business practices. 
An effective anti-corruption strategy will of necessity be multi-faceted 
Shleifer and Vishny (1993) highlight an important difference between two basic forms of official 
corruption: one involves collusion between officials and private citizens at the expense of the state; the 
other involves the abuse of power by officials to extract rents from private agents. An official might, for 
example, be charged with allocating some sort of permit to those who meet specific criteria and/or pay a 
certain fee. The official could collude with private citizens and accept bribes in return for issuing permits 
to those who do not meet the criteria or do not pay the fee, or he might demand payment over and above 
that required by the law in return for issuing the permits to those otherwise entitled to them.96 In the former 
case, the citizen and the official work together to cheat the state; in the latter case, it is the citizen who is 
being cheated.  
Different approaches are needed to combat these two forms of corruption. The best way to prevent the 
former is to make it as hard as possible to steal from the state; otherwise, detection will be difficult, 
because the citizens involved will not complain. This approach is reflected in efforts to tighten control over 
budgetary expenditure and to increase top-down monitoring of officials and executive bodies by organs 
like the Accounts Chamber. A free press able to rely on legal norms that favour the transparency of state 
bodies also has a key monitoring role to play. Where bureaucrats try to extract rents at the expense of the 
public rather than the state, the citizen and the official have a conflict of interest: in this instance, the best 
approach is to give citizens effective means to defend themselves against racketeering by officials. Here, 
little has yet been done, especially with respect to such well known problems as corruption on the part of 
the the militia (ordinary police), the traffic police, and such bodies as the fire and sanitation inspectorates. 
These problems are often ignored or even denied by the state institutions in question. Rooting out this latter 
form of corruption will depend crucially on the availability of effective institutions available to the victims 
of such corruption – ordinary citizens and entrepreneurs. These institutions must be both able and willing 
to discipline official; they might include not only the courts but also some regulatory bodies or 
ombudsmen.  
Whatever the differences in emphasis between the strategies adopted for tackling these different forms 
of corruption, greater transparency, the elimination of unnecessary regulation and the simplification of 
administrative procedures will be critical to both. The ‘de-bureaucratisation’ legislation of 2001–02 in part 
reflected this approach: by simplifying regulations, it sought to eliminate opportunities for corruption as 
well as to reduce the burden of compliance on businesses. The de-bureaucratisation package also reflected 
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to some extent the need to find a way to reduce the bureaucratic burden on business even in the absence of 
a successful civil service reform. Apparently unable to change the interfering and often predatory 
behaviour of many ‘street-level’ bureaucrats, the government tried simply to take away some of their 
power. However, this strategy clearly has limits. Bureaucrats find ways to resist curbs on their authority 
and, given the need for an efficient, good quality public administration in Russia, de-regulation of this kind 
can be only a partial solution to the problem. 
Of course, corruption is not by any means limited to the state. The suborning of officials by private 
agents is no less a problem than the abuse of power by officials for personal gain. Here, too, there is much 
more to be done in an effort to prevent, detect and punish corruption. In order to fulfil its international 
obligations, Russia still needs to bring its rules and regulations into line with international standards with 
respect to criminalising the giving of bribes to domestic or foreign public officials.97 ‘Whistleblower’ 
protection measures could also play a role, provided that enforcement was effective enough to assure 
public and private sector employees that they would be protected if they reported suspected bribery. 
Judicial reform is far from complete and much remains to be done to establish the rule of law 
With much of the basic legislative framework governing the judiciary now substantially improved, the 
major challenge in the field of judicial reform will be the struggle to rid the courts of corruption and 
political influence – the so-called ‘shadow justice’ that the president decried in his 2001 message to the 
Federal Assembly. The involvement of state prosecutors and the security organs in commercial and 
political disputes remains a problem, as does judicial corruption. While managerial surveys suggest that the 
arbitration courts command more respect than most state institutions, this is chiefly a reflection of the low 
esteem in which the latter are held. The courts are still widely regarded as susceptible to political or other 
outside pressure or inducements, and a considerable body of circumstantial evidence suggests that this 
perception is often accurate.  
Some steps have been taken to strengthen judicial independence, including a new law on the status of 
judges, which raises judicial pay (in an effort to reduce corruption) and puts in place new mechanisms for 
punishing judicial malfeasance.98 However, effective, consistent implementation of such measures will be 
difficult. The federal centre has also sought to improve the financing of the entire judicial system, so as to 
reduce the dependence of judges on regional authorities. The creation in 2003–04 of a new tier of 
arbitration courts, the arbitration appeals courts, will potentially be of even greater significance. Each of 
these new courts encompasses a number of jurisdictions. Hitherto, appeals against arbitration court 
decisions have been heard in the court of first instance, often with the same judge presiding. By creating a 
higher-level tier of courts to hear first appeals, the authorities hope to enhance the chances for a fair 
hearing of appeals and to reduce further the ability of regional bosses to meddle in judicial decision-
making.99 Other relatively straightforward steps that could be taken to curb judicial bias and corruption 
might include random assignment of cases to judges, rather than the existing system where cases are 
allocated based on caseload and specialisation of the judges, and the mandatory publication of all 
significant judicial decisions, including the legal reasoning underlying those decisions. The Supreme 
Arbitration Court, which publishes its own decisions, has indicated that it plans to extend this practice to its 
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appellate courts and, eventually, to courts of first instance.100 As of early 2005, however, this practice could 
be described as patchy, at best: some local arbitration courts published selected decisions, while others 
appeared to publish none. 
These are desirable steps, but it would be a mistake to think that the power of regional or municipal 
authorities is the major problem here. There is a more general need for effective arrangements to insulate 
the judiciary from political pressures emanating from any level of government, not least the federal 
authorities, as well as to reduce the scope for interference in judicial processes by private agents. As the so-
called ‘Yukos case’ has demonstrated, the federal authorities are themselves inclined at times to use the 
law enforcement agencies and judicial proceedings to pursue essentially political objectives. The need to 
curb executive-branch interference in judicial decision-making also points to the complementarities 
between judicial reform and the broader reform of state institutions. Attempts to pursue the former in 
isolation from the latter – such as the judicial reform package of 2001 – have had limited impact, largely 
because the real relationship between the judiciary and the executive branch changed little as a result of the 
new legislation. Reducing the scope for executive-branch officials to intervene in judicial processes is 
arguably a sine qua non for preventing private parties from seeking to subvert the course of judicial 
proceedings. As long as it engages in such practices itself, the state will find it hard to curtail corruption in 
the judicial system or to prevent powerful private-sector interests from abusing judicial processes. 
Establishing the rule of law will require more than reform of the judicial system. Upholding the rule 
of law requires a strong state, capable of rights and providing impartial rule adjudication and enforcement. 
However, a state strong enough to perform these functions may succumb to the temptation to act arbitrarily 
itself. The rule of law thus needs not only a strong state but also strong institutions capable of constraining 
that state and, in particular, of constraining its coercive capacities.101 However, Russia largely lacks 
effective coercion-constraining institutions. Indeed, while the Russian state has often – and rightly – been 
described as a ‘weak state’, its capacity for coercion has been better preserved than any capacity for 
effective regulation or service provision and is out of proportion to its other institutional capacities. The 
strongest political institutions in Russia tend to be those best equipped for coercive action, while the 
weakest tend to be those charged with regulating the state’s exercise of its coercive power. This makes it 
exceptionally difficult for the state credibly to commit itself to rule-governed behaviour. The weakness of 
this commitment has been particularly evident in the political and legal campaign directed against the oil 
company Yukos since mid-2003, but the Yukos case is unique only in its scale and visibility. The security 
services, the prosecutors and the police remain highly politicised and have been deployed with disturbing 
frequency against businessmen in conflict with federal or regional authorities. 
Greater coherence is needed in the application of rules across all levels of government 
One of the major aims of policy since 2000 has been the reconstruction of Russia as a unified legal 
space. By the end of the 1990s, thousands of laws adopted by Russia’s constituent provinces, territories 
and republics were in conflict with federal norms, as, indeed, were many provincial charters and republican 
constitutions. One estimate in 2000 was that up to 30 per cent of sub-national legal acts would need to be 
amended, if not abolished, in order to bring lower-level legislation into line with the 1993 constitution and 
federal statutes. Over the last four years, several thousand regional and local laws and normative acts have 
been eliminated or amended in order to rectify such problems, and the Justice Ministry has established a 
register of over 100,000 laws in an effort to monitor matters. Yet the impact of this formal tidying up of the 
legal order has been limited in practice. Business surveys suggests that, for both foreign and domestic 
companies, the far more serious problem remains the inconsistency with which laws and regulations are 
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interpreted and applied, particularly by sub-national governments. The formal rules of the game have 
changed substantially, but the informal rules often seem to remain exceedingly complex, arbitrary and 
opaque. 
The state’s role as a property owner needs further attention 
While the reform of the state’s basic administrative, judicial and regulatory institutions must now be 
regarded as perhaps the critical reform priority, a focus on the role of the state also raises issues of state 
ownership and the governance of state-owned companies. The Russian state remains an extremely 
important player in the economy, not only through the provision of public goods and services but also via 
its ownership of substantial productive assets. In many cases, continued state ownership of productive 
assets creates conflicts of interest for the authorities (particularly where the state’s role as regulator is in 
tension with its role as owner) and serves to distort competition. Moreover, there is considerable evidence 
to suggest that state-owned  companies are generally less efficient than their privately owned rivals and 
that enterprise insiders in large state companies are able to extract significant rents for themselves.102 
Russia’s reform agenda thus includes questions concerning the extent of further privatisation, the creation 
of suitable governance arrangements for companies that remain in state ownership and the implementation 
of policies that prevent anti-competitive behaviour on the part of state or private firms.  
The government has committed itself to a wide range of reforms in this area, including substantial 
further privatisation and an ambitious restructuring of the electricity sector. It has also expressed an 
intention to increase transparency and level the competitive playing field in sectors such as natural gas, 
where state-owned concerns will continue to play a dominant role.103 However, actual progress in recent 
years has generally been relatively slow, and there have recently been signs that the state is now inclined to 
extend its asset holdings in some key sectors rather than reduce them. Certainly, there has been a tendency 
for it to intervene more directly in industrial sectors that are regarded as ‘strategic’. 
Further privatisation will help relieve the state of the burden of unwanted assets 
One reason for the state’s ineffectiveness as a property owner is the presence on its books of 
thousands of more or less ‘accidental’ holdings – residual stakes in enterprises that the authorities, for 
various reasons, have never sold. Thus, the main aim of most privatisation sales in recent years has simply 
been to rid the state of the burden of managing large numbers of enterprises and shareholdings that it has 
no interest in keeping. This is proving rather difficult: in 2003, the authorities sold only 59 per cent of the 
970 unitary enterprises slated for privatisation and 37 per cent of the planned 1,695 blocs of shares. Further 
adjustments to existing privatisation legislation may help to accelerate the process of selling off small, 
illiquid blocs of shares and the large numbers of small unitary enterprises which there is no reason to retain 
in the state sector. The main difficulty in selling state shares in joint-stock companies is that the vast 
majority of the state’s remaining stakes are small, and it is difficult, given Russia’s current standards of 
corporate governance, to sell small stakes in companies that already have effective owners. In 2003, for 
example, 67 per cent of the shareholdings put up for sale were stakes of 25 per cent or less of the 
companies’ equity – in other words, they were not even ‘blocking minorities’.104 Only 8 per cent were 
majority stakes. The illiquidity of small stakes makes it difficult to auction them, even where the 
companies involved are relatively attractive. In 2003, 62 per cent of the auctions held to sell state shares 
did not in the end result in a sale.  
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Part of the problem is that the privatisation law that entered into force in 2002 makes it difficult to 
offer such shares for sale in other ways. The law was largely written to prevent the privatisation abuses 
seen in the 1990s and thus makes it difficult to sell any state assets cheaply. As a result, the cost of 
preparing a small, illiquid shareholding for sale according to the law can exceed the price it will fetch. This 
is not an insoluble problem. The government is now working on steps to streamline the disposal of such 
small stakes. This will have to be done with care, however, in order to ensure that the streamlined 
procedures are not abused. At the same time, the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade is pressing 
for better organisation of auctions, including better marketing and provision of information to potential 
buyers.  
Steps are needed to improve privatisation processes 
A new law on the privatisation of state and municipal property was adopted in 2001 and entered into 
force the following year. In an effort to reduce conflict among the different state bodies involved in 
privatisation policy, the new law allocates responsibility for different categories of privatisation to different 
levels of government. The list of strategic enterprises and categories of state assets excluded from 
privatisation is now left to the determination of the president, while the Federal Assembly shares 
responsibility for the possible privatisation of large state-controlled monopolies such as Gazprom, the 
electricity monopoly RAO UES and Russian Railways. Privatisations in this sphere require the enactment 
of separate laws. The privatisation of all other federal property falls within the competence of the 
government. The privatisation of municipal or regional property is handled by the corresponding level of 
sub-national government. The law also provides for a system of auctions and tenders in which all 
participants have, at least in principle, an equal chance of acquiring the assets up for sale. However, it does 
little to increase the transparency of privatisation processes or to ensure equity in the conduct of 
privatisation tenders. The practice of structuring privatisation requirements so as to favour specific bidders 
continues. Thus, recent privatisations, including the sale of the state’s remaining stakes in Lukoil and 
Slavneft, continue to look like largely pre-arranged affairs.  
The governance of companies destined to remain in state ownership needs to be re-examined 
The much more serious issue concerns the state’s holdings in a number of companies that the 
authorities consider to be strategically important and have no intention of privatising. Some of these 
strategic holdings are in the defence sector, while others are engaged in infrastructure provision or other 
activities characterised by a significant degree of natural monopoly. However, many operate in 
competitive, or potentially competitive, sectors, such as banking and the extraction of oil and natural gas. 
There is a need to clarify the boundary between the state and the private sector, especially where state-
owned entities continue to combine commercial activity with what are effectively regulatory or social 
service functions. There is a strong presumption in favour of a shift to the private sector activities that are 
commercial and (actually or potentially) competitive, and that do not involve sensitive regulatory or 
public-service functions. There is likely to be scope both for further privatisation of state-owned assets, 
particularly in sectors like banking and electric power. Unfortunately, there has since 2003 been evidence 
of a shift in the other direction, towards expanding the state’s role in ‘strategic’ sectors, such as oil. Given 
the track record of most large, state-owned companies in Russia, this is not encouraging. As Ahrend 
(2004b:8–10) shows, output and productivity have generally grown much faster in sectors that are 
relatively free of state ownership and interference. Moreover, in sectors like oil, where private and state-
controlled companies operate side by side, the former companies have consistently been much more 
efficient. The extension of state control over resource-exporting industries is thus likely to lead to less 
efficiency, more rent-seeking and slower growth in the very sectors that have been driving growth in recent 
years. 
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With respect to the governance of state-owned companies, several priorities need to be borne in mind: 
• State-owned entities engaged in commercial activities should not be charged simultaneously with 
the performance of regulatory functions. The most egregious examples of this phenomenon are 
RAO UES and OAO Gazprom, the monopolists dominating the electric power and natural gas 
sectors respectively. While reform of the power sector is now under way, there is little indication 
of any movement with respect to the gas sector.  
• The governance of state-owned enterprises should be structured so as to minimise the scope for 
either using state-owned companies as instruments of economic and social policy or for granting 
them privileged regulatory treatment which could distort competition in the affected sectors 
(e.g. Gazprom, Vneshtorgbank). Ownership of commercial enterprises should, in particular, be 
separated from policy-making and regulatory functions – the CBR’s control over Sberbank is 
particularly problematic in this respect.105 The fact that governance arrangements can probably 
never eliminate such conflicts of interest entirely constitutes a strong argument for privatisation, 
except where there are compelling reasons to keep assets in state ownership.  
• State-owned companies should be held to the highest standards of corporate governance when it 
comes to such issues as transparency and the treatment of minority shareholders, two areas where 
some state-controlled entities in Russia have sometimes fallen short of the ideal. 
More needs to be done to curb the role of officials in the day-to-day activities of private firms 
Private business in Russia remains over-regulated. Private entrepreneurs continue to be subject to too 
many rules and procedures, many of which no longer serve any legitimate governmental purpose, if indeed 
they ever did. In general regulations and regulatory procedures are also more complicated than they need to 
be. Excessive red tape, however, is only part of the problem. Surveys of entrepreneurs show that 
businesspeople continue to face major problems as a result of the instability of the regulatory frameworks 
they confront and inconsistency in the interpretation and administration of regulations, particularly at local 
level.106 Altogether, this combination of excessive regulation, frequent rule changes and inconsistent 
application make it extraordinarily difficult for private businesses to be certain of remaining on the right 
side of the law, which makes for yet more risk and uncertainty arising in connection with the regulatory 
burden. Moreover, as is well known, such a situation leaves considerable discretion in the hands of 
officials dealing directly with businesses, and can thus create opportunities for corruption. The nature of 
the problem is well illustrated by a recent cross-national assessment of the business climate in 16 emerging 
market economies. Managerial surveys in these countries suggest that only two had lighter tax burdens 
than Russia’s, but Russia ranked tenth in terms of the quality of tax administration, twelfth in terms of 
managerial time spent overcoming bureaucratic hurdles and last in terms of the proportion of enterprises 
reporting that they encounter official corruption.107 On the whole, small and medium businesses are most 
vulnerable to such pressures, as they are generally least well positioned to defend themselves. Over-
regulation of this sort thus constitutes a significant impediment to the development of the SME sector and 
thus, to some extent, to the diversification of economic activity into new endeavours. 
Rectifying this state of affairs will not be easy. As noted above, the ‘de-bureaucratisation’ package did 
appear to bring about some improvement, but progress slowed over 2002–03, and there is considerable 
evidence to suggest that officials became increasingly creative in limiting the impact of the de-
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bureaucratisation measures. There is clearly scope to do more. Although the survey data for 2001–03 
shows a steady improvement in entrepreneurs’ overall assessment of the business environment, excessive 
documentation requirements remain high on their list of complaints and around half identify one or more 
regulatory problems (licensing, registration, inspections, etc) as either a ‘very serious’ problem or as one 
‘threatening the existence’ of the firm. Licensing regimes, in particular, merit further consideration, 
especially in view of evidence that the cost of licences (in both time and money) has been rising sharply. 
When the bill reducing the number of economic activities subject to licensing requirements was making its 
passage through the government in 2001, individual ministries and departments fought hard to preserve 
their own licensing powers. The number of areas of economic activity subject to licensing more than 
tripled during the course of the bill’s passage into law, despite the fact that many of the most obviously 
‘licensable’ fields of activity were expressly excluded from its provisions altogether, including finance 
(banking, insurance and the operation of financial exchanges were all excluded), communications 
(including both terrestrial and satellite communications, as well as broadcasting), international transport, 
agriculture, natural resource-based industries, education, nuclear energy, arms production, foreign trade 
and the production of spirit and/or alcoholic beverages. Scores of activities continue to be subject to 
licences that would not be required in most developed market economies, and many of these licensing 
regimes should be scrapped. 
It will take some effort to ensure that the abolition of licensing regimes is real and not merely formal: 
in some instances, the abolition of ‘licences’ has given rise to new systems of ‘permissions’ 
(‘razresheniya’), which are neither authorised nor forbidden by law. Bureaucrats thus continue to regulate 
market entry even where it is clear that they are not supposed to. The crucial aim must be to establish – in 
practice and not merely on paper – that whatever is not forbidden is permitted and to protect open market 
entry. Where it is necessary to retain licensing regimes, they should be revised so as to increase 
transparency and limit official discretion. Many of the most lucrative activities in Russia rest on licensing 
regimes – including resource extraction, telecommunications and banking, to name but three. In such 
sectors, mere bureaucratic discretion can represent a deadly threat to a business – a threat that officials do 
appear to exploit from time to time. In this context, the new draft law on the subsoil, which envisages a 
shift from reliance on licensing and bureaucratic discretion to a regime based on civil law agreements, is to 
be welcomed. A further step would be to implement plans to remove the powers of the police and other 
officials (such as fire and sanitation inspectors) to close down businesses on their own authority will be an 
important further step. A bill approved by the cabinet for submission to the Federal Assembly would 
require such officials to apply to the courts if they wished to close down businesses for regulatory 
violations. Despite the well known weaknesses of the judicial system, this could significantly reduce small 
businesses’ vulnerability to bureaucratic rent-seeking. 
Competition policy should play a stronger role 
Many sectors of the Russian economy are characterized by high levels of ownership concentration.  
This concentration may not interfere with competition in truly internationalised sectors, provided that 
markets remain open to international competition. Indeed, in sectors like oil and metals, where the 
international players are very large, industrial consolidation may well be desirable. But these same levels 
of concentration can cause problems in domestic markets, including facilitation of collusive behaviour and 
provision of opportunities for abuses of market power to prevent new entry or growth of competing firms.  
The effects of such behaviours, including lowered efficiency, slowed growth rates and higher costs for both 
consumers and producers, can be substantial. Moreover, Russian markets are often less open than they 
appear, owing to informal barriers, particularly between regions. Even in relatively open tradables sectors, 
large and powerful domestic companies are capable of exercising significant market power, particularly in 
regional markets. Competition law has been weak in its provisions on these types of anticompetitive 
conduct, and the competition authority’s attention diluted by too many tasks. As the government 
concentrates efforts on stimulating a more broadly-based economic growth, more effective prevention of 
 ECO/WKP(2005)17 
 55 
anti-competitive behaviour will be vital.  The competition authority should be strengthened, and stiffer 
penalties should be set for anti-competitive behaviour.  
The role of competition policy will be particularly important in the non-tradables sectors, where the 
discipline of competition from foreign imports is, by definition, absent. The fact that several important 
non-tradables sectors in Russia are largely monopolised, state-controlled and subject to restrictions on 
foreign entry merely reinforces these concerns. Given the Russian authorities’ concern with industrial 
competitiveness and economic diversification, it is crucial to note that the competitiveness of tradables 
sectors is directly affected by the competitiveness of non-tradables,108 and this, in turn, depends in no small 
measure on the degree of competition in non-tradables. This is not, however, solely an issue for 
competition policy: structural reform of major infrastructure sectors is also necessary, not least because the 
current configurations of the gas and electricity sectors, in particular, can make it extremely difficult to 
identify anti-competitive behaviour and take action in a timely fashion.109 While reform of the power sector 
is now under way, there has been little sign of any readiness to restructure the gas sector or even to reassess 
the role currently played by Gazprom, which combines commercial and regulatory functions in a highly 
untransparent fashion. This has constituted a significant impediment to the development of the sector in 
recent years. At the same time, the competitiveness of Russian tradables sectors would also be enhanced by 
the elimination of many of the administrative barriers erected by regional and local authorities, which are 
particularly prone to intervene in such sectors as fuel and energy, passenger and freight transport, and 
communications, generally in ways that serve to stifle competition in an effort to protect local markets. 
There are complementarities between stronger competition policy and better corporate governance 
Although the connection between corporate governance and competition policy is not intuitively 
obvious, further efforts to improve the former will also serve to strengthen the latter. The effectiveness of 
the competition authority’s efforts to monitor M&A activity, to investigate collusion or to deal with 
possible abuses of market power depend in no small measure on transparency of ownership. The use of a 
number of formally independent legal entities to conceal beneficial ownership or to obscure relationships 
among parties is most often employed to shield the company from possible state predation, to evade taxes 
or to conceal the nature of related-party transactions. However, such stratagems can also be used to 
circumvent competition law. Even where the identities of the true owners are well known, proving the 
relationships involved can be difficult. Russia is by no means the only economy in which a wide range of 
screening devices are sometimes employed in order to conceal beneficial ownership, but these practices are 
so pervasive in Russia as to constitute a real problem for the competition authority – as well as for state 
bodies involved in the conduct of tenders (especially privatisation tenders) or granting licences. There is 
much still to be done here: Russian law still lacks a clear, explicit definition of beneficial ownership, while 
attempts to regulate the activities of related parties are handicapped by the fact that the definition provided 
in the law on joint-stock companies is both narrow and ambiguous.110 Full disclosure of beneficial 
ownership and stricter controls on related party transactions would thus serve to improve the protection of 
shareholders’ rights – the primary aim of such reforms – and also to strengthen competition policy. Here, 
as in so many other fields, reforms in seemingly distinct spheres are in fact closely related and indeed 
complementary. 
                                                     
108. The competitiveness of tradables sectors is affected by the prices paid for land, service, utilities and other 
non-tradables. 
109. For details, see Pittman (2001) and OECD (2004a:146–51, 155–61, 191–2). 
110.  See OECD (2004c), pp. 3–6 for details on these two points. 
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Many sectors would benefit from a relaxation of restrictions on foreign investment 
As noted above, the law on foreign investment now extends national treatment to foreign investors in 
most respects. However, numerous formal and informal barriers to foreign investment remain, including 
sector-specific limits on foreign ownership in some sectors, permit procedures that apply only to non-
residents and regulations governing the employment of foreign personnel in foreign-owned firms. These 
serve little purpose other than to protect incumbents in the sectors affected – usually domestic producers, 
but sometimes also foreign firms that had established themselves in the market before the regulations were 
adopted. These restrictions tend to depress overall levels of foreign investment and may also skew 
somewhat its sectoral distribution. Among the formal restrictions that should be relaxed, if not eliminated 
altogether, are limits on foreign activities in the financial sector (see below) and agriculture, as well as in 
such industries as aviation, land transport, telecommunications and media.111 It is striking that many of 
these sectors, not least agriculture and aviation, are in dire need of investment. Other restrictions are 
general, rather than sector-specific, such as the 1999 law on government procurement, which limits foreign 
participation in tenders.112 However, the main barriers facing non-residents are probably not formal 
legislative restrictions such as these but rather the overall complexity of regulation in Russia and the 
inconsistency and unpredictability with which much of it is applied at all levels of government. Given the 
often bewilderingly complex bodies of formal rules on the books and the lack of transparency of most state 
institutions, there is all too often a significant gap between the formal and informal rules of the game. 
Reliance on unwritten rules, of course, tends in almost any situation to favour insiders and to handicap 
outsiders in general and foreigners in particular. This reliance on informal norms and unwritten rules also 
tends to foster corruption. 
There has also been much discussion recently of including potentially severe restrictions on foreign 
participation in the development of natural resource deposits in the new law on the subsoil now being 
prepared. This could have a particularly significant impact on foreign investment in the oil industry, 
hitherto the sector of greatest interest to foreign investors. The draft submitted to the government in 
December 2004 would authorise the government to limit access to auctions for any firm with a foreign 
partner on national security grounds. While this would represent no change from the status quo, the text 
does not specify in any detail how it might be applied. In principle, it could be applied to any company 
with a foreign shareholding, exempting very few from the restrictions. However, such a radical 
interpretation of the provision is highly improbable; its more likely effect would be to provide the 
authorities with a legal basis for determining in somewhat ad hoc fashion which companies would and 
would not be allowed to participate in competitions for exploration and production rights. Finally, it should 
be noted that some regulations that apply in principle to all companies are more likely to affect foreign 
investors; the remaining currency controls are a case in point. 
Yet while relaxing informal and formal discrimination against non-residents will be important in 
attracting investment, sustained growth in FDI will, in fact, depend on many of the same factors as 
investment growth more generally. The main restraints on FDI are not so much direct formal restrictions as 
problems with the institutional environment that affect domestic and foreign businesses. These include 
high barriers to entry in many sectors, the weakness of the judicial system and extensive bureaucratic 
interference in – and often predation on – private businesses. While these often affect foreigners more than 
domestic actors, addressing them will provide important benefits to foreign and local investors alike. 
                                                     
111. See OECD (2004b:77–9) for details.  
112. Discrimination in government procurements is not limited to foreigners; regional and local authorities also 
tend to discriminate in many cases against Russian companies based outside their jurisdictions.  
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Steps are needed to reform sectors dominated by state-controlled monopolies 
Natural gas, electricity, rail transport and banking are four areas in which structural reforms are of 
tremendous importance. The essentially infrastructural character of all four sectors means that 
improvements in the efficiency of each could have potentially enormous knock-on effects for other 
industrial and service sectors. For the same reason, failure to reform them is likely to impede not only their 
development but the growth of the economy as a whole. To date, the authorities have launched major 
reforms in the latter three sectors, with rail reform being the furthest advanced at present, while there has 
been almost no progress in reforming the gas industry, arguably Russia’s least reformed major sector and 
undoubtedly one of its least efficient.113 The four sectors differ in many important respects, and there is 
certainly no single model of reform applicable to all, but there are a few common challenges worth 
highlighting.114  
• In each case, one of the major aims of reform is to make resource allocation more efficient – in 
the banking sector, by fostering the development of efficient financial intermediation and in the 
rail, power and gas sectors by putting an end to the provision of implicit subsidies and cross-
subsidies via tariffs which are below long-run cost-recovery levels. Such subsidies are value-
destroying and distort resource allocation and investment incentives.  
• All four sectors will require a fair degree of regulation even after reform. This makes issues 
pertaining to the competence and probity of state institutions particularly relevant, as well as 
questions relating to the capacity of the state to create strong, independent regulators and to 
produce high-quality regulation.  
• The state is extensively involved in all four sectors, not only as a regulator but also as the owner 
of the monopolists that dominate each. In all four cases, the state’s management of the 
monopolists is characterised by a basic tension between the desire to make the monopolists more 
efficient and the habit of imposing unprofitable social obligations on them – obligations that are 
often ‘compensated’ via fiscal or regulatory privileges.  
• This, in turn, points to the desirability of separating regulatory and ownership functions more 
clearly and of reducing the state’s ownership of banking, rail and energy sector assets. This has 
been a major element of rail reform, but the overlap between the two functions continues to be 
particularly marked in the gas sector. 
• In each of the sectors, the state-controlled monopolies act at times in ways that distort or simply 
suppress competition. It is no accident that they are among the entities most often in conflict with 
the competition authority. However, attempts to challenge such behaviour have generally been 
unsuccessful, owing to the weakness of the competition authority and of the general framework 
of competition law and policy in Russia.  
• A further argument for reducing the state’s ownership role in these sectors stems from evidence 
suggesting that insider managers in the major state monopolies have often been able to divert 
cash flows from them and to engage in what is euphemistically described as ‘informal profit-
seeking’ (i.e. rent extraction) at the expense of the state. In some cases, state assets have been 
                                                     
113. See Ahrend (2004b) and Ahrend and Tompson (2004a). 
114. For detailed analyses of natural gas, electricity and banking, see OECD (2004a); on electricity, see also 
IEA (2005). On rail reform, see ECMT (2004). 
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alienated to persons or entities affiliated with insider managers; in other instances, cash flows are 
diverted or concessionary terms are offered to related private entities. 
• In each instance, questions of transparency are central to reform. While recent years have seen 
some progress with respect to increasing the transparency of Sberbank, Gazprom, RAO EES and 
the railways, there is still more than can and should be to done to enhance the transparency both 
of the companies involved and of the policy-making and regulatory processes. Nowhere is this 
more evident than in the gas sector. Gazprom stands out, even in the context of Russia’s highly 
secretive corporate culture, for its exceptional opacity – an opacity which is more pronounced in 
its performance of various quasi-sovereign functions as in its commercial affairs.115 
The reform of Russia’s state-controlled monopolies thus is a multifaceted process, in which a number 
of the specific reform challenges outlined above come together. While this makes monopolies reform a 
particularly difficult test, it also suggests that there could be significant spill-over effects, in terms of 
establishing precedents and building state capacities, from successful reforms in these sectors. 
The authorities need to tackle gas-sector reform 
As noted above, Russia has undertaken a major overhaul of its railways sector and has also embarked 
on the restructuring of its power sector.116 The reform of Russia’s crucial and highly monopolised gas 
sector, however, has repeatedly been postponed, and it is not clear that any substantial reform will be 
undertaken in the foreseeable future. Despite its enormous importance, the natural gas industry is perhaps 
the least reformed major sector in Russia. Both the up- and down-stream sectors are dominated by a state-
controlled, vertically integrated monopolist, OAO Gazprom. Though organised as a joint-stock company, 
Gazprom in some respects operates as an arm of the state. It combines commercial and regulatory 
functions, and maintains tight control over the sector’s infrastructure and over information flows within it. 
Gazprom’s control over information is particularly problematic, as it renders opaque much of what 
happens in the sector. Underlying all of this regulation and rationing is the unsustainable under-pricing of 
natural gas, which constitutes a subsidy from the gas sector to the rest of the economy. Most gas continues 
to be sold at regulated prices that are below full cost-recovery levels, although regulated tariffs for all 
consumers except households are now rapidly approaching cost-recovery levels. While gas tariffs have 
risen rapidly since 2000, outpacing both consumer- and producer-price inflation, they still have some way 
to go to reach long-term sustainable levels. 
The inefficiencies inherent in the sector’s architecture would, on their own, constitute compelling 
arguments for reform: an economy as dependent on its resource sectors as Russia’s can ill afford such 
inefficiencies in what is arguably its most important resource industry. However, the case for reform is 
even more compelling in view of the need to raise investment and output very substantially over the 
coming years in order to meet rising domestic demand and growing export commitments. The natural gas 
sector as it is currently constituted is highly unlikely to be able to sustain sufficient output growth to satisfy 
internal and external demand over the long term. Given that the importance of gas extraction and exports to 
Russian growth is likely to grow over the medium term, this is a particularly serious concern. Both 
Gazprom and the government acknowledge that non-Gazprom production must grow rapidly if the gas 
industry is to develop successfully, but Gazprom’s current position within the sector constitutes a 
significant impediment to such growth, restricting both small producers’ access to the market and 
consumers’ freedom to choose their suppliers. There is significant potential for accelerating the growth of 
non-Gazprom production and making gas supply in Russia more competitive. This potential cannot be 
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realised until Gazprom’s domestic rivals can be assured of equal treatment, which is impossible as long as 
Gazprom controls both the information flows and the infrastructure. Certainly, Gazprom has no incentive 
to exclude them from the market altogether; indeed, it wishes to see their role in supplying domestic 
consumers increase. However, Gazprom’s position gives it considerable scope to ensure that the smaller 
producers market their gas on terms that suit Gazprom: the monopolist can discriminate against other 
producers and it has incentives to do so. The establishment of an effective regulated third-party access 
regime for the sector’s infrastructure is likely to be absolutely crucial to the outlook for investment by non-
Gazprom producers. 
There is thus an immediate need to increase transparency in the sector and also to transfer what are 
essentially regulatory functions from Gazprom to the state. Over the medium-to-long term, Gazprom’s 
natural monopoly/infrastructure provision functions should be separated from its potentially competitive 
activities. In particular, this will necessitate unbundling Gazprom’s transport and dispatch operations into 
separate entities. This will be a long and complex process, which should not be executed in haste; it is 
therefore important that restructuring be planned and started soon. Finally, tariff policy needs to be both 
more transparent and more consistent. The government is committed to raising tariffs to cost-recovery 
levels and has made considerable progress in doing so already. However, it is understandably reluctant to 
risk lower growth and higher inflation by raising tariffs too rapidly. A big-bang approach would hit 
households and industry extremely hard. Both need time to adjust. However, the need for a more gradual 
approach makes it all the more important that the authorities commit credibly to a price path for regulated 
tariffs and to clear, transparent methodologies for calculating them. This would, inter alia, make it easier to 
introduce longer-term contracts into the sector. At present, tariffs are adjusted once or even twice a year, 
and the increases often look somewhat ad hoc, the product of bargaining between the government and 
Gazprom. Various drafts of the government’s energy strategy and other official documents have outlined 
medium-term targets for gas prices, but price increases to date have consistently been smaller than these 
targets would imply. The targets for gas price increases reportedly included in the May 2004 agreement 
with the EU on WTO entry should therefore be seen as an important step forward, for they represent a 
binding commitment undertaken by the government in an international agreement. At the same time, the 
authorities should consider ways of ensuring that the state captures a larger share of the rents resulting 
from current very high gas prices, or at least that these rents are directed towards the development of the 
gas sector. Gazprom has recently shown a tendency to use these rents to acquire all manner of assets, many 
of them unrelated to its core functions. 
The absence of real progress on gas-sector reform must surely be counted one of the government’s 
major policy failures of recent years. Many structural reforms are politically difficult to implement 
precisely because they involve large up-front costs, while the benefits of reform will be realised only over 
the long term. Certainly, any fundamental restructuring of the gas sector would be a complex, and lengthy 
process. However, there are a number of relatively modest steps that could be taken rather quickly and that 
would begin to pay tremendous dividends at an early stage. The establishment of effective, regulated third-
party access to the trunk pipeline network and some access to export markets for non-Gazprom producers 
would give a tremendous boost to the industry. Once assured that they would be able to enter the market on 
fair terms, non-Gazprom producers could increase investment and output very rapidly indeed. At present, 
however, they remain constrained by the authorities’ failure to break Gazprom’s stranglehold on the 
industry. Non-reform in the gas sector also risks distorting the on-going reform of the electricity sector, as 
well as attempts to press ahead with reform of the municipal utilities.117 
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Better regulation of the financial sector will help foster the development of real financial intermediation 
The extent to which the various segments of the financial sector come to perform the roles expected of 
them – and, in particular, the extent to which they develop as effective mechanisms for the mobilisation 
and intermediation of savings and the management of risks – will depend to a great extent on the vigorous 
implementation of a range of regulatory reforms now in the works, as well as on wider economic 
developments. All the major financial sectors have been under-regulated, although they have often been 
subjected to quite onerous reporting requirements and other red tape. The banking sector best exemplifies 
this problem: only in the last few years has there been a consistent drive to privilege substance over form in 
regulating the sector. The challenge for reform in the other two sectors is similar: first, to reduce the 
burden of red tape and the proliferation of highly formalistic regulatory requirements, which are costly for 
market actors but achieve little; and, secondly, to establish effective regulatory systems that are stable, 
transparent and focused on substance rather than form. These tasks are explored in greater detail below. 
Banking reform will test both the political will and the regulatory capacities of the authorities 
After years of delay, the pace of banking reform accelerated markedly in early 2002. The most 
important reform initiatives of the last two years have included deposit insurance legislation, a major 
reform of the framework for prudential supervision, steps to increase transparency in the sector, and 
measures to facilitate the development of specific banking activities. Each of these measures is an 
important step in its own right. Even more important is the ‘fit’ between them: the various strands of 
reform complement each other well, which reflects the coherence of the CBR’s overall strategy. The 
emphasis on transparency, in particular, is especially welcome, as greater openness will facilitate better 
monitoring of banks by private-sector agents. The real test of this banking reform strategy, however, will 
be in implementation. The reforms challenge numerous vested interests and their successful realisation will 
require considerable political will as well as the development of regulatory capacities of a very high order. 
In this connection, it must be observed that the authorities’ handling of turbulence in the banking sector 
during May-July 2004 revived doubt about their ability and willingness to press ahead with difficult 
reforms. The CBR was slow to react to the crisis as it developed, and when it finally did take action, some 
of its decisions were difficult to reconcile with its stated policies.118 However, of greatest concern were the 
mixed signals emerging from the Kremlin and the government, which suggested that the authorities were 
not united in their approach to banking reform and raised questions about whether the CBR really could 
count on the political and administrative support needed to press ahead with its planned reforms. The 
success of banking reform will also depend in no small measure on other institutional improvements, many 
of them not directly related to banking. A large and growing body of empirical research emphasises that 
the success of deposit insurance and of systems of prudential supervision are closely related to the overall 
institutional environment and to the rule of law in particular.119 This suggests yet another set of 
‘complementarities’ among different structural reform policies. 
More needs to be done to reduce the state’s role in the provision of banking services 
There is also a need for a clearer government strategy with respect to the future of state-owned banks; 
at present, Russia’s largest banks continue to be controlled by the state, while regional authorities continue 
to intervene, sometimes quite heavy-handedly, in local banking sectors, suppressing competition and 
impeding entry. There are good reasons for seeing the state’s continuing dominance of the banking system 
as a problem. State ownership and state intervention in credit allocation tend to distort competition, to 
                                                     
118. The extension of a loan to state-owned VTB, enabling it to buy a threatened but still viable Guta-Bank, 
stands out as a particularly troubling precedent, as did the apparent attempt to use Sberbank as a lender of 
last resort on the inter-bank market. 
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aggravate moral hazard by encouraging the expectation of a bailout, and to undermine the efficiency of 
intermediation, as banks often pursue policies that reflect the non-commercial requirements of the 
authorities rather than good commercial sense. The short history of Russia’s banking sector exemplifies 
many of these problems, particularly with respect to competition and the imposition of hard budget 
constraints on banks. Official policy is that state-owned banks should exist, if at all, to correct market 
failures: their activities should be specialised in sectoral and other niches which the market will not address 
on its own. In practice, however, the major state-owned banks in Russia have tended to operate as 
universal banks, with Sberbank, in particular, exploiting its protected retail monopoly to extend its business 
in other directions. It is now the dominant bank in a number of market segments, not only retail. 
Vneshtorgbank, too, has become increasingly aggressive in its drive to expand, at times with the apparent 
support of the regulatory authorities for steps that contradict stated policies toward the sector. 
The Russian authorities have long been committed in principle to reducing both state ownership of 
commercial banks and the intervention of state institutions in credit allocation. However, progress has been 
slow. The government and the Bank of Russia should undoubtedly proceed cautiously in considering any 
major changes to the status of Sberbank or other very large state-owned banks, but the status quo is 
undoubtedly problematic from the point of view of banking sector development. While a more 
fundamental restructuring, involving privatisation of most of the state’s banking assets, is likely to prove 
desirable over the long term, the more urgent priority must be to reduce the distortions caused by the 
state’s current position in the sector and to facilitate the growth and consolidation of private banks capable 
of competing with Sberbank and other state-owned banks. These might include steps to simplify mergers 
and acquisitions, and also to facilitate easier branching, as well as the rigorous application of prudential 
norms to state-owned banks. Above all, the authorities should consider changes to the governance structure 
of the main state-owned banks that would make possible a credible commitment by the government and 
the central bank neither to extend special privileges to them nor to intervene in their commercial affairs. 
Addressing the problems posed by state-owned banks will be crucial to tackling the more general problem 
of promoting competition in the banking sector, which is still relatively weak. This is particularly 
important in view of recent empirical research suggesting that greater competition in banking allows 
financially dependent industries to grow faster.120 
Financial markets need better sector-specific regulation and better framework conditions 
Russian financial markets are also under-governed, a matter of particular concern in view of their 
rapid growth. Gaps in Russian legislation exist in a number of key areas. Work has begun on new bills to 
deal with insider trading and market manipulation, but they could take some time to adopt, as the courts’ 
lack of experience in handling such issues means that the language of the new statutes must be drafted with 
exceptional care. The relatively short list of permitted securities set out in Russian statute is considered to 
be exhaustive: no one can create new forms of securities without legislation. There is a need to make the 
existing securities laws more open to financial innovation and in particular to provide a stronger legal basis 
for such activities as mortgage finance and asset securitisation. There is still no proper legislation 
governing derivatives either. Small markets in instruments such as options and futures exist, but their legal 
position is uncertain.121 There is also uncertainty over the practice of close-out netting, whereby all 
transactions of a given type are netted at market value in the event of one party’s bankruptcy. Such debt 
off-sets are not permitted in the event of bankruptcy in Russia, which greatly increases the risk for 
derivatives providers. The authorities are well aware of the problems listed above and, in many cases, are 
actively working on measures to address them. Hitherto, conflicts among competing regulatory authorities 
have bedevilled attempts to develop the non-bank financial sector. It is to be hoped that the creation of the 
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new Federal Securities Market Agency will lead to an acceleration of reform and greater coherence in the 
regulation of different market segments.  
The development of financial markets, like that of the banking sector, is in many ways constrained by 
problems with the larger contracting environment. The weakness of the rule of law is a particular problem 
here. Securities markets are markets in legal claims and obligations. They are only as good as the legal 
system supporting them. Also important are corporate governance issues, including ownership 
transparency and the extent and quality of disclosure. The desire to raise new capital on securities markets 
or to increase market capitalisation is, of course, a major incentive to improved disclosure and governance. 
For successful borrowers, the bond markets, in particular, offer unsecured credit for longer terms than 
would be available from banks. At the same time, poor corporate governance and lack of disclosure make 
it more difficult to police securities markets. Finally, corruption and rent-seeking on the part of officials 
can undermine the effectiveness of even the most enlightened regulatory framework, since the 
administration of the rules is as crucial for market participants as their content.  
The financial sector would also benefit from the removal of the remaining barriers to foreign entry 
Russia stands to gain considerable benefits from greater foreign participation in its financial sector, 
even though there are strong protectionist pressures within the banking and insurance sectors, in particular. 
While Russia does not necessarily need or want a financial sector dominated by foreign players, it does 
need a higher level of foreign involvement in both banking and insurance, if only to reap the benefits 
foreign banks can bring to the sector in terms of skills, technology and credibility. It would therefore be in 
Russia’s interests to eliminate the remaining restrictions on foreign entry into these sectors – something 
Russia is likely to have to do in any case as part of its WTO accession process. While there is no longer 
any limit on the foreign capital share in the Russian banking system,122 a number of lesser restrictions on 
foreign involvement remain, including the requirement that the CBR approve any acquisition of shares in a 
Russian bank by non-residents. However, the CBR is pressing for changes that would subject foreign 
investors to the same percentage thresholds as domestic investors when it comes to requiring prior 
approval for share acquisitions. There are also other regulations, such as those governing the appointment 
of foreigners as top managers or board members of Russian banks, which depend to a great extent upon the 
judgements of the CBR.123  
Formal barriers to foreign entry are far more extensive in the insurance sector and include a 25 per 
cent ceiling on the foreign capital share in the sector.124 EU-based insurers enjoy a better position than 
other foreign insurance companies, because many of the restrictions on foreign activities do not apply to 
the former under Russia’s Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the European Union. EU insurers 
have recently gained the right to engage in the provision of all types of insurance, including life insurance 
and mandatory insurances, such as motor insurance. Subsidiaries of foreign insurance companies from 
outside the EU and Russian insurance companies that are more than 49%-owned by non-EU foreign 
                                                     
122. In any case, the ceiling had never actually had legal force nor had foreign banks come close to breaching it. 
At the beginning of 2004, non-residents owned stakes in only 128 Russian credit institutions, of which 
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entities or individuals are excluded from the provision of compulsory insurances or life insurance.125 There 
are also special regulations concerning the role of foreign citizens in managing insurance companies and 
governing the sale of shares in Russian insurance companies to non-residents or increases in the charter 
capital of insurance companies paid from outside the Russian Federation. 
Conclusion 
The foregoing discussion has addressed a wide range of disparate and often rather technical issues. 
However, the analysis also returns again and again to a small number of fundamental questions. This is 
neither accidental nor the product of needless repetition. It reflects the two key lessons that emerge from 
this overview of structural reform in Russia.  
The first concerns the need to continue working to establish sound, basic institutions and framework 
conditions for the market economy. Neither the revision of formal laws and regulations nor the pursuit of 
technically complex reforms of key sectors like rail transport, power or pensions can do much to foster 
economic growth and development in the absence of a major improvement in the way the Russian state 
itself functions. Considerable priority must still be attached to such basic issues as strengthening the rule of 
law and the security of property rights, increasing the transparency and accountability of state institutions, 
and combating corruption. There is still more to be done to curtail the state’s propensity to rely on direct 
intervention and control over assets and markets rather than on impartial regulation, and to create a state 
administration that is able – and willing – to perform the role required of it in a well functioning market 
economy. The core of that role is the provision of the public goods that private agents need in order to 
invest, produce and transact efficiently. Many of these goods – like the rule of law – are not even 
‘economic’ in the narrow sense of the word.126 However, they are crucial to Russia’s long-term economic 
future. 
The second theme that runs through the analysis above is the need to pursue reforms across a broad 
front, in order to realise the complementarities that exist among various reforms, many of which have 
been noted above. This is a critical point: while policy coherence, the term most frequently employed by 
international organisations, is often viewed as a political constraint, policy complementarity signals the 
possibility of realising the additional benefits that may stem from pursuing different strands of reform 
together. Policy complementarities arise when the returns generated by two or more reforms in tandem 
exceed the sum of those that would be realised if they were each pursued separately.127 The potential 
benefits arising from complementarities among different strands of reform underscore the importance of 
formulating an explicit, coherent, long-term reform strategy, adopted at the highest levels of government, 
to integrate the various reform efforts now underway.  
Consideration of these two themes helps clarify a final, crucial question facing the Russian 
authorities: the relative priority of different reforms. As is clear from the foregoing analysis, there is an 
enormous amount to do, and it would be both unrealistic and unfair to believe that any government could 
do it all at once. However, the emphasis on reform complementarities and on shoring up the basic 
institutions of the market economy suggests two lines of policy that might be considered the top priorities:  
                                                     
125.  Allianz and AIG were in the life insurance business in Russia before this legislation was adopted in 1993 
and so were exempt from this restriction even before the EU-Russia agreement relaxed the rules governing 
EU insurers operating in Russia. 
126. Most are concerned in one way or another with the formulation, implementation and enforcement of rules 
and regulations. Frameworks of laws and rules are best viewed as abstract public goods. To the extent that 
they are consistently and impartially applied, they are ‘jointly consumed’: both rivalry and excludability 
are low. If they are effectively enforced, then exit is low as well. 
127. See Braga de Macedo and Oliveira Martins (2005).  
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• ‘State reform’ in a broad sense (i.e. judicial and administrative reform). The knock-on effects 
generated by real steps to strengthen the independence and probity of the judiciary and by even a 
moderately successful reform of the civil service would be tremendous. Prospects for the 
successful implementation of virtually every other major structural reform would be improved, 
while the reduction in official corruption and rent-seeking would of itself represent a major 
improvement in the business climate. 
• Further reductions in barriers to entrepreneurship. This second priority is very closely related to 
the first, since many of the barriers in question stem not from formal regulation of new 
businesses but from informal – and often corrupt – practices on the part of officials. The potential 
complementarities between the two reforms are clear: further reductions in de jure and de facto 
licensing and other regulatory burdens would reduce bureaucrats’ opportunities to intervene in 
the affairs of private businesses, while judicial and civil service reforms would improve the 
fairness, transparency and efficiency with which the remaining regulations were administered.  
To judge from their programmatic statements, the Russian authorities understand, and are committed 
to, these priorities. Recent years have seen important steps towards realising them. However, the actions of 
state bodies often contradict stated reform goals, and there has also been considerable evidence of a drift 
towards more interventionist, less rule-governed – and sometimes predatory – state behaviour. Russia’s 
long-term growth depends in no small measure on checking such tendencies and reinvigorating those lines 
of reform that aim at creating not merely a strong state, but one which is law-based, accountable and 
efficient. 
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